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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we develop a dynamic CGE model to examine the impact of CAFTA on production, 
employment and poverty in El Salvador.  We model four aspects of the agreement: tariff reductions, 
quotas, changes in the rules of origin for maquila and more generous treatment of foreign investment. The 
model shows that CAFTA has a small positive effect on growth, employment and poverty. Tariff 
reduction under CAFTA adds about .2% to the growth rate of output up to 2020. Liberalizing the rules of 
origin for maquila has a bigger positive effect on growth and poverty mainly because it raises the demand 
for exportables produced by unskilled labor.  We model the foreign investment effect by assuming that 
capital inflows go directly to capital formation.  This raises the growth rate of output by over 1% per year 
and lowers poverty incidence in 2020 by over 25% relative to what it would be in the baseline scenario.   
These simulations say something important about the growth process in a country like El 
Salvador in which it seems reasonable to assume that there is idle unskilled labor willing and able to work 
at a fixed real wage. In such an economy, growth can be increased in one of three ways. First, already 
employed resources can be moved to sectors where they are more productive. That is what the tariff 
reductions under CAFTA do, and the result is positive but small.  Second, the structure of demand can be 
changed in such a way as to increase the demand for previously unemployed unskilled labor. That is what 
the maquila simulation does, because maquila uses a lot of unskilled labor relative to skilled labor and 
capital.  Finally the supply of capital can be increased by increasing the rate of capital formation. That is 
what happens in the FDI simulation.  
Key words:  CAFTA, El Salvador, growth, poverty, CGE model   1
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA–DR) was negotiated in 2004 between the United 
States and five countries of Central America: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua. The treaty was later expanded to include the Dominican Republic (DR). It promises greater 
access to the U.S. market for Central American and Dominican exporters and liberalized treatment on 
rules of origin for the maquila industry It includes all sorts of assembly, but about 90% are textile and 
clothing firms., in exchange for reduced barriers to imports, guarantees for foreign direct investment, and 
greater protection for intellectual property by each of the signatories. For El Salvador, CAFTA is a logical 
further step in a process of trade liberalization and reform that has made its economy one of the most 
open in the region. Its policy is devoted to attracting foreign investment and expanding exports, 
particularly to the United States. In effect, by tying itself more firmly to the global economy in general 
and to the United States in particular,
1 El Salvador is gambling that its development prospects will be 
enhanced.  
Even though El Salvador was the first country in Central America to ratify CAFTA (in December 
2004), the agreement has been controversial. Some feel that lowering tariffs on the products they grow 
will hurt El Salvador’s poor farmers. Others feel that the treatment of foreign investment and intellectual 
property rights is too generous, and the protection of the environment is too lax. In addition, the prior 
commitment to trade liberalization and reform does not seem to have done much for the Salvadorian 
economy. While the economy did grow quite rapidly in the early 1990s, as tariffs were reduced, there has 
essentially been no growth in the last 10 years, partly because El Salvador has suffered a series of natural 
disasters since the late 1990s. Whatever the reason for this poor performance, it has increased skepticism 
about the supposed benefits of CAFTA. 
The purpose of this paper is to identify and quantify the effects that adherence to the Agreement 
will have in the years ahead. First, we summarize the changes in the level of protection that El Salvador 
and the United States have agreed to in the CAFTA Agreement. Second, we use a Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) model to simulate the effects of these changes on domestic production, employment, 
prices, and factor incomes. Because the changes in tariffs and quotas in the Agreement are gradual, our 
model is dynamic. With it we hope to be able to show how the economy will react over time to these 
policy changes. Finally, we use the results of the CGE simulations to determine the effects of the various 
CAFTA scenarios on poverty and the distribution of income.  
                                                      
1 In addition, El Salvador dollarized its economy in January, 2001.   2
2.  TRENDS IN INCOME, TRADE, AND PROTECTION PRIOR TO CAFTA 
Even before CAFTA, El Salvador had already significantly reduced barriers to imports. During the 1990s 
the average tariff rate was cut by almost two-thirds, so that by 1999 the country had the second lowest 
tariff levels and the smallest tariff dispersion in Central America (Table 1). That means that CAFTA does 
not represent a significant change in direction in general tariff policy. Averages, of course can hide 
significant differences in protection across sectors. But the negotiators of CAFTA were quite careful to 
maintain protection for politically sensitive products such as foodcrops, at least in the short and medium 
run.  
To get a sense of the economic environment in which CAFTA was passed, we present several key 
sectoral and macro time series since 1990 in Table 1. The first thing that stands out in the table is the 
deterioration in El Salvador’s growth performance beginning in about 1995. Whereas per capita income 
grew at 4 percent per year in the first five years of the 1990s, growth slowed to 1 percent per year from 
1995–2000 and did not grow at all in the next four years. Critics of trade liberalization could be pardoned 
for questioning the benefits of a growth strategy based on trade liberalization. Agriculture has been 
particularly hard hit by trade liberalization; its share of gross domestic product (GDP) fell by almost 50 
percent after 1990. That was offset to some extent by the rise of a vibrant fishing sector. As the table 
shows, industry has maintained its share of GDP since 1990. This is entirely due to the rise of the maquila 
component, which by 2002 comprised 11 percent of GDP (Morley 2006). Since virtually all of the 
expansion of maquila happened after 1990, the data suggest that nonmaquila manufacturing must have 
shrunk by at least 4 percent of GDP. Two points follow from this. First, maquila plays a significant role in 
the story of the potential impact of CAFTA. Second, other than maquila and fishing, the rest of the traded 
goods sector has not benefited from trade liberalization to date. This is partly due to the succession of 
natural disasters and partly to the effects of an increasingly overvalued exchange rate resulting from the 
success of maquila and the large quantity of remittances flowing into El Salvador from migrants in the 
United States.    3
Table 1.  Patterns of growth and tariffs in El Salvador 
             T a r i f f   d a t a  
Year  GDP per 
capita  INV/Y EXP/Y IMP/Y  AG/Y Min + 
Fish/Y  IND/Y SVC/Y Average Dispersion 
shares (current prices) 
1990  939.4799 0.139 0.186 0.312  0.171  0.018 0.267 0.543  0.160  0.086 
1991  954.9056 0.154 0.172 0.305  0.171  0.023 0.067 0.539     
1992  1006.261 0.185 0.161 0.324  0.142  0.023 0.296 0.539     
1993  1057.613 0.186 0.194 0.341  0.140  0.064 0.282 0.514     
1994  1097.564 0.197 0.200 0.352  0.140  0.067 0.280 0.513     
1995  1142.901 0.200 0.216 0.378  0.134  0.076 0.274 0.516  0.102  0.076 
1996  1138.013 0.152 0.211 0.339  0.130  0.074 0.274 0.522     
1997  1161.788 0.151 0.259 0.376  0.134  0.067 0.273 0.526  0.102  0.057 
1998  1180.847 0.176 0.248 0.371  0.120  0.066 0.282 0.531     
1999  1197.218 0.164 0.249 0.373  0.105  0.065 0.293 0.537  0.057  0.034 
2000  1199.116 0.169 0.274 0.424  0.098  0.066 0.295 0.541     
2001  1196.377 0.167 0.258 0.416  0.094  0.069 0.299 0.538     
2002  1200.383 0.162 0.264 0.411  0.085  0.068 0.302 0.544     
2003  1200.076 0.167 0.267 0.430  0.085  0.072 0.300 0.543     
2004  1197.116 0.156 0.272 0.442  0.088  0.071 0.287 0.554     
Source:  World Development Indicators. For tariff data, see Lederman, Perry, and Suescun (2002).  
*Percentages of GDP at current prices   4
3.  TRADE LIBERALIZATION UNDER CAFTA 
The CAFTA treaty specifies precisely how tariffs on all commodities are going to be eliminated or 
reduced over time. For each country, the agreement contains a long and detailed list of commodities, with 
both the current most-favored nation (MFN) tariff and a tariff category to which the commodity has been 
assigned. These categories determine how quickly tariffs will be reduced over time. Table 2 shows the 
categories that are relevant to El Salvador. 
Table 2. Tariff Categories under CAFTA 
Category    
A  Immediate tariff reduction to 0 
B  Linear reduction of tariffs to 0 over 5 years 
C  Linear reduction of tariffs over 10 years 
D  Linear reduction of tariffs over 15 years 




F  Ten-year grace period, then linear reduction to 0 over the next 10 years 
G  Goods in this category already have a 0 tariff rate 
H  Goods in this category are excluded from tariff reductions under CAFTA, with tariffs 
remaining at the rates agreed to by the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
M  Nonlinear reduction in tariffs to 0:  2% in 1
st year, 8% per year from 3
rd to 6
th year, and 16% 
per year from 7
th to 10
th year 
N  Elimination of tariffs in 12 equal annual steps 
O  Six-year grace period and then elimination in 9 nonlinear steps: 40% from 7
th to 11
th year, 
and 60% from 12
th to 15
th year 
P  Ten-year grace period, then elimination over 7 years: 33% from the 11
th to the 14
th year and 
67% from the 15
th to the 18
th year 
Q  Elimination over 15 years: 15% in 1
st year, 33% from the 4
th to the 8
th year, and 67% from 
the 9
th to the 15
th year 
Source:  CAFTA-DR Treaty 
For a subset of sensitive agricultural products, CAFTA also expands a system of tariff rate quotas 
(TRQs), originally set up under the World Trade Organization (WTO), which define the amounts of 
certain commodities that can be imported free of tariffs.
2  In addition, for many products, safeguard 
provisions permit a country to apply the MFN tariff level if imports from the United States or imports 
from Central America to the United States exceed the safeguard level. Safeguards are provisions 
permitted under WTO (and the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade [GATT]) regulations, by which 
imports beyond the safeguard level can be temporarily restricted if the affected industry can show that it 
will suffer serious injury from that level of imports. In most cases, the tariffs at the safeguard level fall 
over time.  
                                                      
2 These are products that are politically sensitive or produced or consumed by the poor.   5
We now turn our attention to changes in the level of protection of agricultural commodities under 
CAFTA (Table 3). As is pointed out above, commodities under CAFTA are divided into various 
categories, according to the time profile of programmed tariff reductions under the agreement. Table 3 
shows the amount of trade in each of the tariff categories for all agricultural and processed agricultural 
products, and the level and changes in the average tariff in each of the categories.
3 
For example, in category A, tariffs are eliminated immediately, while in B they are reduced to 
zero in five equal installments over the first 5 years and in C over the first 10 years. Note that these are all 
weighted averages of individual tariff rates, where the weights are determined by the commodity’s share 
in total imports. As is well known, under this method, the average level of protection can be seriously 
underestimated when tariffs are so high that they choke off imports.  
 Certain commodities like beans, corn, and rice are of particular importance to the poor, from 
both the income and consumption viewpoint. We have used the information on tariff categories and initial 
tariffs (in the column called pre-CAFTA, table 3) to calculate the time path of tariff reductions for a 
number of these “sensitive” commodities; the results are presented in the lower portion of Table 3. Note 
that the table shows only the tariff level, not the impact of quotas, which we will discuss later.  
A high level of protection is clearly afforded to domestic producers of sensitive products, 
particularly yellow corn, poultry, pork, beans, and rice.
4  This pattern may, at least to some extent reflect 
the desire by the Central American governments to protect their producers from subsidized exports from 
the United States. A recent study estimated that subsidies in the United States amounted to 41 percent of 
the value of production of rice, 50 percent for milk, and 32 percent for corn (Monge, Sagot, and Gonzalez 
2004). With the exception of white corn, tariff protection for all of these sensitive products will disappear 
over 20 years. But for most, liberalization will be very gradual, much of it occurring at least 10 years after 
the treaty goes into effect. This is important. In Central America, many have protested that CAFTA will 
hurt small farmers by reducing protection of commodities of particular importance to smallholders and 
the poor. The evidence in the table makes it quite clear that this will not be the case, at least for the first 5 
to 10 years. It seems that the Salvadoran negotiators of CAFTA were not willing to impose a shock 
treatment on the producers of these sensitive commodities. But it is also clear that over the long run, the 
reductions in tariffs for these commodities are considerable. Domestic producers are given a fairly long 
time to adopt new crops or new and more efficient production techniques. But in the long run, they will 
have to adjust to a far lower level of protection.  
                                                      
3 Note that formally CAFTA only reduces Salvadoran tariffs on goods imported from the United States. For simplicity, in 
this paper, the CAFTA tariff reductions are treated as if they apply to all imported commodities. This implies that the estimates of 
the impact of tariff reduction will be overstated. The reason for this simplifying assumption is that the tariff rates are so low that 
the differences between the true effect and the estimates are necessarily small.  
4 This pattern is observed not only in El Salvador but also in the other Central American countries (Morley 2006).   6
Tariffs in categories A and B are either eliminated immediately or over the first five years of the 
agreement. These categories include products such as prime cuts of beef, fish, flowers, various fresh fruits 
and vegetables, potatoes, and inputs to processed foods such as soups and dog food. For the most part, 
these are not products in which U.S. imports compete with local producers. For fish, fruits, and 
vegetables, it is unlikely that U.S. prices would compete with the local products even at a zero tariff. The 
picture for beef is more complicated. Central American cattle growers do not now produce prime cuts of 
beef, so the increase in tariff-free imports should have little effect on local producers. In fact, because 
CAFTA grants beef import quotas to   the United States, the treaty is on balance likely to be favorable to 
them.  
Category C commodities are those with a 10-year linear tariff reduction schedule. This group 
primarily comprises processed foods. Commodities in the D and F categories will see a gradual reduction 
of tariff protection over 15 or 20 years, respectively. Thus whatever impact CAFTA has on producers in 
these two categories will necessarily be quite drawn out. The bulk of D category products are dairy 
products, processed foods, chocolate, malts, and products made from vegetable oil or animal fat. 
The treatment of different agricultural commodities under CAFTA was anything but uniform 
(Table 3). Over half of imports either had no protection prior to CAFTA (category G) or had tariff rates 
set to zero upon ratification of the agreement. A second group of commodities will have their tariffs 
lowered, but the process will be quite gradual. Finally, for several sensitive commodities such as white 
corn, rice, poultry, and dairy, tariffs are either not lowered at all or not lowered significantly until at least 
10 years after ratification.  
Table 3. Tariff reductions under CAFTA 
       Average  tariff  rates 
Tariff 















A  18836  1055  398  13.39% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
B 9376  898  141  12.85%  10.28%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
C 17553  7614  153  15.33%  13.80%  7.68%  0.00%  0.00% 
D 6249  34825  89  18.24%  16.96%  12.17%  6.07%  0.00% 
G  146154  576  245  0.00%  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
N 2135  335  17  21.18%  19.49%  12.36%  3.53%  0.00% 
Yellow corn  48854  0  1  15.00%  15.00%  15.00%  9.00%  0.00% 
White  corn  644  0  1  20.00%  20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 
Quota  19276  42  42  38.58%  38.50% 38.50% 38.50% 25.68% 
Total  268433      8.53%  6.43% 6.43% 4.62% 1.89% 
   7
Table 3. Continued 




corn  Rice Beans  Beef  Pork Poultry Diary 
Initial  0.150 0.2  0.400  0.15  0.15  0.400  0.370  0.002 
Year 1  0.150 0.2  0.400  0.12  0 0.400  0.306  0.002 
Year 5  0.150 0.2  0.400  0  0 0.400  0.253  0.002 
Year 10  0.102 0.2  0.400  0  0 0.272  0.228  0.002 
Year 15  0 0.2 0.213  0  0 0  0.121  0.001 
Year 20  0 0.2  0  0  0 0  0  0 
Source: Morley (2006) 
When the tariff reductions are allocated across the sectors used in the CGE-based simulations 
(Table 4), the average tariffs shown are the weighted averages of individual commodity tariffs where the 
weights are the import shares of the commodities in question. Table 4 gives a good idea of which sectors 
still had high levels of protection prior to CAFTA and how that protection is slated to change over the 
next 20 years. Trade liberalization in the 1990s reduced protection in all manufacturing sectors other than 
clothing, tobacco, and processed foods. Most of the sectors with high tariffs were either agricultural or in 
sectors closely tied to agriculture such as dairy, meat, and tobacco. This means that for the most part, 
further trade liberalization under CAFTA will primarily affect agriculture either directly or indirectly. 
Tariffs go to zero in all sectors by year 20, but the process is not uniform. As we already saw in Table 3, 
liberalization for subsistence commodities does not begin until almost 10 years after ratification. 
Protection does drop rapidly for textiles and bananas, but since these are both export sectors it is not clear 
how important this change in protection really is.    8
Table 4: Tariff changes under CAFTA by sector and year 
     Year 
   Base  year  1  5  10 15 20 
1 Coffee  14.83  13.84  9.89 4.94 0.00 0.00 
2 Cotton  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3 Grains  12.73 12.21 12.20 10.01  2.74  0.00 
4 Sugarcane  40.00 37.33 26.67 13.33  0.00  0.00 
5  Other agricultural activities  14.37  7.12 2.93 0.55 0.00 0.00 
6 Livestock  and  poultry  7.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
7 Forestry  1.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
8 Fisheries  13.31  2.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
9 Mining  0.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10 Meat  products  18.88  18.91  15.39  8.50 0.51 0.00 
11 Diary  products  19.90 20.71 20.53 20.33 10.16  0.00 
12 Wheat  manufacturing  10.00  9.16 5.82 1.66 0.00 0.00 
13 Sugar  14.78  13.71  9.73 4.75 0.00 0.00 
14  Other processed foods  8.92 5.92 3.66 0.91 0.00 0.00 
15 Beverages  21.49  15.39  8.58 1.66 0.00 0.00 
16 Tobacco  products  28.71  27.50  19.64  9.82 0.00 0.00 
17 Textiles  9.52 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
18 Wearing  apparel  21.00  1.32 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 
19 Leather  products  11.28  1.06 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 
20 Wood  products  3.32 0.36 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 
21 Paper  products  5.44 4.28 1.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 
22 Printing  and  publishing        
23 Chemicals  3.16 1.67 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 
24 Petroleum  products  5.44 1.17 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 
25  Rubber and plastic products  3.59 1.43 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 
26 Mineral  products  7.06 3.58 1.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 
27 Metal  products  3.33 2.46 1.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 
28  Machinery and equipment  4.35 1.40 0.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 
29 Transport  equipment  8.69  17.20  12.63  0.00 0.00 0.00 
30 Electricity  5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
31 Construction  1.50 3.33 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Source: Authors’ calculations   9
4.  MODELING THE IMPACT OF CAFTA 
To predict the impact of CAFTA on the Salvadorian economy,
5  we use a recursive dynamic general 
equilibrium model, which identifies the effects of the changes introduced by CAFTA on prices, output, 
and employment across different sectors of the economy. Since changes in trade liberalization under 
CAFTA are mainly limited to tariff reductions in various agricultural commodities, they will obviously 
affect prices, output, and employment in agriculture. But they will also have indirect effects on urban 
consumers, government revenue, prices, the balance of payments, and the exchange rate, which well may 
be larger than the direct effects of the tariff reductions in agriculture, as well as second-round effects. In 
this section we will give a short overview of the model, with a complete mathematical and technical 
discussion relegated to Appendix 1.  
The Recursive Dynamic CGE Model 
Recursive dynamic CGE models have been used in Chenery, Robinson, and Syrquin (1999); El-Said, 
Lofgren, and Robinson (2001) to analyze different development strategies in Korea and Egypt; in 
Lofgren, Harris, and Robinson (2001) as a tool to model changes in poverty resulting from various policy 
alternatives; and finally in Thurlow (2003), who developed a recursive dynamic model for South Africa.
6  
These models are solved in two stages. The first stage aims to find a solution for a one-year 
equilibrium using a static CGE model. In the second stage, a model between periods is used to handle the 
dynamic linkages that update the variables that drive growth. The intertemporal equations provide values 
for all exogenous variables needed for the next period by the static CGE model, which is then solved for a 
new equilibrium. The model is solved forward in a dynamically recursive fashion, with each static 
solution depending only on current and past variables. The model does not incorporate future 
expectations; instead the behavior of its agents is based on adaptive expectations, as the model is solved 
one period at a time. The variables and parameters used as linkages between periods are the aggregate 
capital stock (which is updated endogenously, given previous investment and depreciation), the 
population, the domestic labor force, factor productivity, export and import prices, export demand, tariff 
rates and transfers to and from the rest of the world (all of which are modified exogenously). The 
dynamic model used in this research follows the models developed by the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) (see Lofgren, Harris, and Robinson 2001; Thurlow 2003.  
                                                      
5 This paper is one of a pair of CGE analyses of the impact of CAFTA at the country level done by the authors, the other 
being on Honduras. A full mathematical statement of the model used for the two papers can be found in Appendix 3 of the 
Honduras paper (Morley and Piñeiro 2007). 
6 This section of the paper is taken from Piñeiro 2006.  10
This model for El Salvador is solved for 2000 (the base year for the data) and then solved 
recursively year by year until the year 2020. This allows us to compare growth trajectories under different 
policy scenarios, as well as tracking changes in policies such as tariff levels, which change slowly over 
time. Most CGE trade models are solved for just the final comparative static equilibrium changes 
resulting from a change in tariffs. Under CAFTA, however, the tariffs change gradually to give affected 
sectors the time to make adjustments, so tracking the timing of impacts of the changes is an important part 
of the analysis.  
 First Step: The Single Period Solution 
Basic data for the CGE models is obtained from a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM). A SAM is a 
comprehensive, economy-wide data framework, typically representing the economy of a country. The 
SAM used in this paper is for 2000 and is based on the SAM developed by Carlos Acevedo and reported 
in Acevedo (2004).  
The CGE model has three components. The first shows the payments that are registered in the 
SAM, following the same disaggregation of factors, activities, commodities, and institutions shown in the 
matrix. The second is the equations that represent the behavior of the different institutions. The third is 
the system of constraints that have to be satisfied by the whole system covering the factor and goods 
markets, the balances for savings–investment, the government, and the current account of the rest of the 
world.  
Each producer maximizes profits under constant returns to scale and perfect competition. There 
are two factors of production: labor (differentiated by skill) and capital. Production is related to factor 
inputs through a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function, which allows the producers 
to substitute these two inputs until they reach the point where the marginal revenue of each factor equals 
the factor price (wage or rent). The producers must also decide on the amount of intermediate inputs they 
will use, assuming fixed shares that specify the appropriate amount of intermediate inputs per unit of 
output and labor/capital (value added). Finally, output prices depend on the value added (cost of labor and 
capital), intermediate inputs, and any relevant taxes and subsidies. 
Figure 1 shows the flow of a single commodity from producers to final demand. First, goods from 
all producers are aggregated into commodity outputs using a CES product demand system. The aggregate 
output is sold domestically or internationally. The producers’ allocation between domestic sales and 
exports is specified via a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function, assuming imperfect 
transformability between exports and domestic sales. The producers sell their products to the market with 
the highest profitability. The domestic price is the international price times the exchange rate plus any 
possible export taxes or export subsidies. The domestic good is combined with imports to produce the  11
composite commodity. For this the Armington
7 specification is used, which means that the domestically 
produced and imported goods are imperfect substitutes.  












Notes: CES is constant elasticity of substitution; CET is constant elasticity of transformation. 
In this model there are four institutions—households, enterprises, government, and the rest of the 
world, which do three things: (1) produce, (2) consume, and (3) accumulate capital. Households save a 
constant coefficient of their disposable income and buy consumption goods. They own the enterprises and 
work in those enterprises. As a result, household income is the sum of salaries, profits, government, and 
rest-of-the-world transfers. Household consumption of goods and services is determined by a linear 
expenditure system. Firms buy intermediate goods, hire factors of production, produce commodities and 
services, and sell them in the market. Government receives taxes, consumes goods and services, and 
makes transfers to households. The capital account collects the savings from the households, firms, 
government, and rest of the world and buys capital goods (investment).  
Closures and Assumptions on Factor Supplies 
The closures are the mechanisms that determine how various macro constraints are satisfied. (1) El 
Salvador has a fixed exchange rate, which means that foreign savings are flexible or endogenous to the 
model
8 for all the simulations except the one for foreign direct investment (FDI), for which a change in 
closure was necessary. For this last experiment, the exchange rate is flexible or endogenous and foreign 
savings are fixed, in order to capture the increases in FDI for the simulation. (2) For the government, the 
level of consumption and income taxes are fixed across simulations. (3) In equilibrium, total saving must 
                                                      
7 Armington (1969). 
8 El Salvador started its dollarization process in 2001. 
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equal total investment. There are various ways to guarantee this. In all but one of our simulations, we fix 
the saving rates of households and government, which makes total saving and investment positively 
related to the level of income. (4) In the labor markets, we assume that there is an excess supply of 
unskilled labor and a fixed real wage rate. We also assume that within each period labor is mobile across 
sectors, which means that real wages are equal across sectors for each type of labor. For skilled labor, a 
supply curve is added, making wages as well as quantities endogenous to the model. (5) Capital is fully 
employed and sector specific, which means that profit rates are free to vary across sectors.  
Second Step: Between Periods  
In the second step of the recursive model, the linkages between periods are introduced. To do this, the 
static model is solved for one specific year and then the capital stock, population, domestic labor force, 
factor productivity, export and import prices, and export demand parameters are updated. The updated 
model is then solved again for the following year and so on.  
Total capital accumulation is endogenous (in all but the FDI scenario) since it is equal to total 
saving, which is endogenous. By definition the capital stock at the beginning of the current period is equal 
to the last period’s capital stock plus net investment last period.
9 The allocation of new capital across 
sectors is done by adjusting the proportion of each sector’s share in aggregate investment as a function of 
the relative profit rate of each sector compared to the average profit rate of the economy as a whole. 
Sectors with higher (lower) average profit rates will get higher (lower) shares of the available investment. 
Over time sector profit rates should converge.  
The reader should note that our version of dynamic behavior may well understate or overstate the 
full reaction of an economy to changes in policies or conditions. In the model, total investment is 
determined by total saving and is therefore endogenous. But neither the saving nor the investment 
decision is modeled directly. Thus we do not incorporate the possible effect on total capital formation of a 
rise in the overall profit rate in response to CAFTA, for example, or a rise in total saving in response to a 
rise in the interest rate. This limited characteristic of our version of the dynamic reaction to changes in 
CAFTA should be kept in mind in interpreting the results presented.  
Turning to the supply of labor by skill, the model determines only the amount of employment. It 
does not distinguish between those who are unemployed and those of working age who are not in the 
labor force. This is an important distinction for skilled labor. For unskilled labor, we assume that up to 
                                                      
9 To estimate the base-period capital stock in 2000, we assume a lifetime of 12 years for capital, where all the depreciation 
occurs in the final year. The estimate of the capital stock in 2000 is assumed to be completely independent of the initial capital 
output ratio and depends only on the level of investment observed between 1987 and 1999. Under these assumptions, the initial 
level of capital turns out to be 1.75 times the level of GDP at market prices. In the dynamic simulations, we set depreciation in 
year t at 8 percent of the capital stock so that the transition equations at time t would depend only on the solution at time t–1.   13
2020 there is an excess supply of labor, which is equivalent to assuming that the rate of growth of 
employment does not exhaust the available stock of either unemployed or inactive unskilled labor.  
For skilled labor, we assume an upward sloping supply curve shifting rightward by 2 percent per 
year and with an elasticity of +5 with respect to the real wage. In addition to unemployment, El Salvador 
has a large pool of well- educated but inactive labor, especially women. We assume that by 2020 this 
group will have grown large enough to supply the amount of skilled labor called for in our sequence of 
short-run solutions. This assumption may be unrealistic in the FDI scenario because of the rapid growth 
rate of employment it requires. Finally, productivity growth, real government consumption and transfers, 
world price of exports, and current account balances are set exogenously based on observed trends. 
For investment we have two different treatments depending on the simulation. For the CAFTA 
simulations related to reduction in tariffs, changes in the maquila scheme, and import quotas, we use a 
saving-driven closure in the single-period solution. In the FDI simulation, we impose the constraint that 
the addition to FDI all be devoted to fixed investment. Therefore, in this simulation, total saving is 
investment driven.  
To summarize, the dynamic accumulation process is updated in three ways: 
1.  by exogenous trends (labor force growth, productivity changes, capital stock growth, and 
population growth); 
2.  by economic behavior (distribution of investment by sector and distribution of labor force by 
sector and category); and 
3.  by implemented policies (changes in tariffs, import quotas, and FDI as a result of CAFTA). 
For the dynamic model, we first do a forward simulation to 2020 to create a base run—one in 
which there are no CAFTA-related changes in exogenous variables. We then run the model with various 
CAFTA policy alternatives and compare those results with the base run. Because we may not have 
completely captured important aspects of dynamic behavior, or because of misspecifications in the model 
itself, we put less weight on the absolute values of our projects than we do in the comparison of the base 
run with the various CAFTA alternatives. In other words, we are less confident in the growth or 
employment forecasts of our base run or CAFTA alternatives than we are in the difference between that 
base run and the CAFTA alternatives.   14
5.  SIMULATING THE IMPACT OF CAFTA 
The dynamic model we have described in the previous section is recursive. It solves the system of 
equations for all the endogenous variables for each period and then updates those variables (such as the 
capital stock, labor force, and tariff rates) that change over time, either because they are endogenous in 
the model, or because they are policy variables that are subject to change. In each of the simulations, we 
run the model from its 2000 base, using the observed values for all exogenous variables up to 2005, and 
then insert the changes introduced by CAFTA after 2005, running each simulation out to 2020. We 
present the results in the form of growth rates of all the endogenous variables of interest from the 2000 
initial values. Each table displays the initial values for each variable and the annual average growth rate 
from 2000 to 2020. There are five simulations. 
Base. This is the projection of the economy without CAFTA. It is our best estimate of how the 
economy would grow in the absence of CAFTA, and therefore it is the counterfactual with which each of 
the CAFTA simulations should be compared.    
CAFTA. In this simulation, we change all the sectoral tariffs according to the time patterns shown 
in Table 4Since these tariff changes vary across both time and sector, it will be useful to show explicitly 
the time path of the response to the changes, in addition to  the 23-year average rate of growth .  
Maquila. Textiles are an area of potentially large benefits but equally large and uncertain risks 
because of the expiration of the Multifiber Agreement in January 2005. In the past (before 2000) in 
Central America, maquila was almost entirely limited to the assembly of clothing from imported inputs. 
From 1984, with the passage of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, the maquila industry was 
exempted from the worldwide quota system then in force. But its products were not exempt from U.S. 
tariffs until the U.S. Congress passed the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Expansion Act  in 1990. 
With the passage of the North American Foreign Trade Agreement  (NAFTA)  in 1994, this advantage 
was partially offset by the more generous treatment of Mexican producers with regard to rules of origin. 
The Caribbean Trade Promotion Act (CBTPA), passed in 2000, extended to the Central American 
countries the market access conditions for maquila granted to Mexico under NAFTA, with similar 
liberalized restrictions on rules of origin. Imports of knitted or shaped apparel were permitted free of 
tariffs, provided that the intermediate inputs from the yarn up to the finished good were produced in a 
CAFTA country.
10 This has had a major impact on production in Central America. But the CBTPA has a 
sunset provision. It will expire in 2008 unless CAFTA is implemented. What CAFTA does for textiles is 
to make permanent the liberalized rules of origin for inputs to the maquila industry granted temporarily 
under the CBTPA. To model the impact of these provisions of the CAFTA agreement, we keep the level 
                                                      
10 Tee shirts and socks were subject to a maximum tariff-free import ceiling.  15
of intermediate imports to the textile industry at the level observed in 2000, prior to the passage of the 
CBTPA. Then, starting in 2005, we reduce these intermediate imports to the very low levels observed 
after the implementation of the CBTPA. This simulation then shows the positive effect to the booming 
maquila industry of domestically producing the intermediate inputs.  
ALLCAFTA. In this simulation, we combine the effects of the tariff reductions plus maquila plus 
tariff-free quotas granted by the United States and El Salvador on particularly sensitive commodities. For 
imports into El Salvador, certain commodities of particular importance to the poor, either as consumers or 
producers, were given special treatment under CAFTA. Tariffs for these commodities were typically quite 
high prior to CAFTA, and the rate of tariff reduction under CAFTA in most cases will be slow, as shown 
in Table 3  But CAFTA also established tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) in many of these commodities, making 
liberalization faster than seems likely from the tariff category in which these commodities were placed. 
These are the commodities in which CAFTA could have a significant effect in the short run, since it 
permits tariff-free imports up to a certain quantitative limit, as soon as the treaty is implemented. In 
addition, the United States granted tariff-free importation for quantities of certain commodities from El 
Salvador. We now look at the most important of these commodities and ask what the impact of the TRQs 
is likely to be in practice.  
For import quotas into El Salvador, what effect will the quota have on domestic prices and 
producers?  It is easy to show that quotas only have an effect on domestic prices and output levels if they 
are larger than the amount previously imported (Morley 2006) If they are smaller, they effectively transfer 
tariff revenue to the importer. In all cases where there are quotas, the amounts relative to either domestic 
production or to the average level of imports suggest that we can safely ignore any effect of the quotas on 
equilibrium prices. Yellow corn has a big quota, about equal to the level of imports. But there is no 
domestic production. In the case of rice, there is a fairly large quota, but it is less than the current level of 
imports, which means that the marginal rice import will pay the tariff. That in turn means that changes in 
the equilibrium solution will be caused by changes in the tariff over time, not the quota. For white corn, 
the quota is quite large relative to imports, but it amounts to less than 5 percent of the level of domestic 
production, so price effects of the quota are likely to be small. Pork is the only commodity for which the 
quota is likely to have a price effect, since it is larger than the current level of imports and amounts to 
about 15 percent of total production.  
FDI. It is relatively straightforward to model the impact of trade liberalization under CAFTA. 
But there are many additional items and agreements in the CAFTA treaty that have to do with the 
treatment of FDI. All are aimed at defining and protecting the rights of foreign investors with respect to 
the protection of intellectual property and expropriation. For many observers these conditions are seen as 
excessively generous to foreign investors. It is beyond the scope of this paper to make a complete analysis  16
of the net benefits or costs of these FDI provisions on the Salvadorian economy. Since no one has a clear 
idea of just how much additional FDI El Salvador can expect to receive under the new CAFTA legal 
conditions, as a first approximation we simply increased by 25 percent the observed level of FDI that 
came into El Salvador between 2000 and 2004. This gives rise to two effects. The first and less important 
one is the simple balance-of-payments effect of an increased inflow of foreign resources. The second and 
more important effect is on total capital formation. These inflows go to capital formation. Therefore in 
this simulation we change our saving–investment closure to ensure that these inflows directly increase 
investment.   17
6.  RESULTS OF THE CGE SIMULATIONS 
Figure 2 shows the trajectory of the Salvadorian economy up to 2020 under the various simulations. The 
solid line at the bottom labeled base is the trajectory, assuming that there are no changes in either external 
conditions or domestic policy except that the temporary import liberalization for maquila under the 
CBTPA is assumed to expire.
11   The remaining lines show the impact on the growth rate of three 
different scenarios: (1) CAFTA, which is tariff reductions alone; (2) MAQUILA, the permanent 
liberalization of rules of origin for inputs to the maquila industry; and (3) FDI, the effect on domestic 
investment and growth of the more generous treatment of foreign direct investment.  
The dynamic model makes the fairly optimistic prediction that El Salvador will be able to reach 
an average annual growth rate of 4.5 percent over the period 2000–20, even with the expiration of the 
temporary maquila benefits. That is far higher than the actual growth rates observed over the last 10 
years, which is partly because we do not include financial crises or natural disasters in our estimation. 
One of the reasons for the relatively high growth rate is the low capital requirement per unit of output that 
is implied by previous rates of capital formation in the country. Another reason is the assumed 
continuation of remittances equal to roughly 3 percent of GDP in the base year 2000. This helps maintain 
demand. Also the reader should remember that the model we have developed does not endogenize the 
saving–investment process. Therefore, one should not put too much emphasis on its growth estimates but 
should instead use its forecasts mainly as a benchmark against which to examine the effect on the growth 
rate of the changes in policy under CAFTA. Assuming the basic saving–investment processes are 
unaffected by CAFTA, the model will do a good job of estimating the changes in the growth rate due to 
CAFTA. In other words, the reader should mainly pay attention to the growth differentials under the 
CAFTA scenarios, rather than the predicted growth rates.  
 
                                                      
11Maquila turns out to be far less important to the Salvadorian economy than it is to Honduras.  18























Source: Authors’ worksheets. 
 
 
As the reader can see, trade liberalization under CAFTA has a positive effect on the growth rate 
of the economy, but the effect is small, with the growth rate rising by only 0.20  percent per year over the 
base scenario. Maquila raises the growth rate by an additional 0.25 percent. What does increase the 
growth rate is FDI. If the CAFTA regulations, which are intended to make the host country more 
hospitable to FDI, actually succeed in attracting foreign investment, the results will be immediate and 
large. Investment rates rise, and by 2020 the capital stock has grown by 25 percent relative to the base 
run. That causes a big increase in the growth rate of the economy and of employment, as we shall see. All 
of this demonstrates the sensitivity of the Salvadorian economy to the rate of capital formation.  
To help shed light on the differential impacts of the changes under CAFTA, the growth rates of 
the main macro aggregates are shown under the four different scenarios in Table 5 over the 20-year 
period (2000–20). Each column corresponds to one of the simulations described in the previous section. 
The first column displays the levels of each of the variables in base year 2000. Note that the columns 
labeled CAFTA and MAQUILA show the effects of these two scenarios considered in isolation. The next 
column (ALLCAFTA) shows the combined effect of all the changes including quotas under CAFTA 
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Table 5. Annual rates of growth of macro aggregates 2000-2020 
 Initial 
value  Base CAFTA  Maquila  All  CAFTA  FDI** 
  2000* (Annual  percentage growth rate 2000-2020) 
Absorption  163.34 4.21  4.49  4.59  4.87  5.50 
Private consumption  123.34 4.21  4.49  4.52  4.80  5.44 
Fixed Investment  26.43 4.35  4.67  4.96  5.29  5.91 
Government consumption  12.92 4.07  4.30  4.58  4.82  5.41 
Exports  47.31 5.01  5.01  5.60  5.69  5.48 
Imports  52.12 4.18  4.18  4.58  5.00  5.54 
GDP (market price)  158.53 4.48  4.48  4.91  5.09  5.49 
Source: Authors’ worksheets 
* In 2000 billion Salvadorean colones 
** Foreign direct investment 
The overall growth rates are as described. Relative to the growth rates in the base, trade 
liberalization by itself increases the rate of growth of both exports and imports and permits a slight overall 
increase in the growth rate of production, investment, and internal demand.  
MAQUILA has a larger positive effect on growth than CAFTA. Trade liberalization by itself 
does raise the growth rate, but the effect of MAQUILA on growth is bigger. It increases the rate of 
growth of exports and imports of nonmaquila commodities, which shifts more of the country’s production 
to unskilled, labor-intensive commodities such as maquila. Note that the overall economy becomes less 
capital-intensive than in the baseline and uses more unskilled labor, which we have assumed is in excess 
supply. That is what permits aggregate growth to jump by about 0.5 percent per year.  
When trade liberalization, maquila, and quotas are combined in the simulation ALLCAFTA, the 
aggregate growth rate is only slightly higher than that for MAQUILA alone. However, the composition of 
output changes with the reduction in tariffs, permitting an increase in the rate of growth of imports, 
consumption, and absorption.  
Of all the simulations, the one that has the largest impact on the growth rate is FDI. Recall that in 
this simulation we hypothesize that in El Salvador, measures to make FDI more attractive to foreign 
investors result in an increase in FDI of 25% above. The average level of FDI between 2000 and 2004. In 
this simulation the key is not just the increase in foreign saving but the assumption that, being FDI, all of 
it goes into capital formation. As a result, the level of investment increases by about 2.5 percent of GDP 
and the growth rate of investment in the economy rises by almost 25 percent. By 2020, the capital stock 
of the economy is 25 percent higher than its level in the base run. Those additional supplies of capital 
have a large impact on the growth rate of GDP and all of its components.  
 
This simulation is in no way a forecast of what the aggregate growth rate will be under CAFTA, 
since we do not know whether CAFTA will induce that much additional FDI. But the simulation does  20
make clear the critical role of capital formation in getting higher growth rates. We should note in passing 
that our recursive dynamic CGE model does not really endogenize the saving–investment process, and so 
may understate the full impact of the changes brought about by CAFTA. Our model takes a given amount 
of investment and allocates it to the most profitable sectors. That is surely part—but only part—of the full 
dynamic story. If CAFTA makes production more profitable, it could well increase the overall rate of 
saving and capital formation. That would increase the growth rate of the economy by more than we show 
in our simulations.  
Changes in Sectoral Growth Rates of Trade and Production 
Turning to simulation results by sector for the various scenarios, trade liberalization under CAFTA 
increases production, imports, and exports in all the sectors shown in Table 6. The differences in growth 
rates between the base run and CAFTA are all positive but small. One might have thought that 
unilaterally reducing tariff barriers might increase imports and crowd out domestic production. While that 
may happen in particular sectors, it does not happen in the aggregate, and in particular it does not happen 
in agriculture. Instead resources move into areas where they are more productive. Overall, output 
increases and the economy become somewhat more open. As expected, maquila increases the growth rate 
of exports and production in manufacturing. Somewhat surprisingly, that increase does not come at the 
expense of agriculture, which also has higher growth rates in the MAQUILA simulation than in trade 
liberalization alone, partly because the rate of growth of capital is faster in this scenario (see Table 5). But 
it is also due to our assumption that there is excess unskilled labor, where the positive stimulus of added 
demand for maquila permits the economy to employ more people, grow faster, and increase the rate of 
growth of capital stock.  
Table 6. National production and trade 
  Initial Share  Base  CAFTA  Maquila  All CAFTA  FDI** 
Sector  2000* (Annual  percentage growth rate 2000-2020) 
Exports            
Agricultural sector  5.71 4.63  4.77  5.03  5.17  5.76 
Primary sector  5.74 4.64  4.77  5.03  5.18  5.76 
Mining  0.03 4.93  4.89  5.32  5.29  6.28 
Secondary sector  77.06 5.35  5.43  6.19  6.27  6.47 
Manufacturing sector  76.82 5.36  5.43  6.20  6.28  6.48 
Food industry  7.57 4.18  4.31  4.52  4.65  5.48 
Tertiary sector  17.21 4.26  4.43  4.62  4.80  5.40 
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Table 6. Continued 
  Initial Share  Base  CAFTA  Maquila  All CAFTA  FDI** 
Sector  2000* (Annual  percentage growth rate 2000-2020) 
Imports            
Agricultural sector  5.30 4.32  4.75  4.59  5.02  5.13 
Primary sector  12.53 4.09  4.39  4.43  4.75  5.06 
Mining  7.23 3.91  4.12  4.32  4.53  5.01 
Secondary sector  74.47 4.25  4.72  4.65  5.13  5.20 
Manufacturing sector  73.38 4.23  4.71  4.63  5.12  5.19 
Food industry  8.64 4.35  4.82  4.65  5.13  5.16 
Tertiary sector  13.00 4.58  4.94  5.02  5.38  5.07 
Production            
Agricultural sector  6.15 4.60  4.77  4.97  5.15  5.75 
Primary sector  6.49 4.61  4.78  4.98  5.16  5.76 
Mining  0.33 4.82  4.91  5.24  5.34  5.93 
Secondary sector  38.90 4.87  5.01  5.50  5.64  5.91 
Manufacturing sector  32.46 4.93  5.03  5.57  5.68  5.94 
Food industry  8.45 4.32  4.51  4.64  4.84  5.39 
Tertiary sector  54.61 4.37  4.58  4.76  4.98  5.47 
Source: Authors’ worksheets 
* Initial share of total exports, imports, and production 
** FDI is foreign direct investment. 
The effects of the various policy scenarios on production in all the sectors of the CGE model are 
shown in Table 7. The growth rates of exports and imports disaggregated in the same way are presented 
in Appendix 1. For most of the sectors, both CAFTA and MAQUILA slightly increase the growth rate. 
When these two effects are combined in the ALLCAFTA simulation, what really stands out is how small 
is the total impact of CAFTA. Changes in sectoral growth rates, plus or minus, are small. This is an 
important result. If the CGE model accurately represents the Salvadorian economy, these results predict 
that the impacts of CAFTA—either positive or negative—on the sectoral growth rates or structure of the 
economy will be quite limited.  
There are two exceptions to this general picture. The first is maquila itself (see the last row in 
Table 7). Not surprisingly, its growth rate sharply increases in the MAQUILA scenario. The second area 
where there are significant effects is in the FDI simulation. If CAFTA really does increase direct 
investment in El Salvador, the results on sectoral growth rates will be fairly dramatic. Note that the 
response would be equally large if domestic savers and investors responded to the expanded profit 
opportunities made possible by CAFTA.    22
Table 7. Sectoral growth rates, 2000-2020 
Sectoral growth rates 
  Initial share  Base  CAFTA  Maquila  All CAFTA  FDI** 
 2000*  (Annual  percentage  growth rate, 2000-2020) 
Production         
Coffee  1.20 4.57  4.72 4.95 5.10 5.60 
Grain  1.71 4.61  4.78 4.98 5.15 5.77 
Sugar  0.32 4.08  4.27 4.40 4.60 5.16 
Other  crops  0.01 5.56  5.05 5.86 5.34 6.56 
Livestock  1.98 4.56  4.76 4.91 5.12 5.73 
Forestry  0.64 5.01  5.16 5.42 5.58 6.29 
Fishing  0.30 4.53  4.68 4.90 5.06 5.68 
Mining  0.33 4.82  4.91 5.24 5.34 5.93 
Processed  meat  0.61 4.64  4.83 5.02 5.21 5.85 
Dairy  0.74 4.55  4.77 4.87 5.10 5.63 
Flour  2.17 4.42  4.65 4.71 4.95 5.42 
Sugar  products  0.58 4.22  4.42 4.55 4.75 5.33 
Other  processed  foods  2.61 4.24  4.41 4.58 4.76 5.36 
Beverages  and  tobacco  1.75 4.12  4.30 4.42 4.60 5.16 
Textiles  2.34 4.68  4.76 4.92 5.01 5.77 
Clothing  0.69 4.34  4.54 4.60 4.81 5.33 
Leather  0.79 4.38  4.54 4.69 4.86 5.44 
Lumber  0.39 4.58  4.70 4.94 5.07 5.70 
Paper  0.62 4.48  4.61 4.84 4.98 5.53 
Publishing  1.33 4.23  4.39 4.54 4.70 5.31 
Chemicals  1.34 4.27  4.40 4.61 4.74 5.31 
Petroleum  2.40 4.03  4.20 4.41 4.59 5.10 
Plastics  0.60 4.27  4.25 4.59 4.57 5.42 
Nonmetallic  minerals  1.06 4.38  4.48 4.86 4.96 5.60 
Metals  1.65 4.97  4.99 5.33 5.36 6.11 
Machinery  1.08 4.68  4.78 5.08 5.19 5.85 
Transportation  equipment  1.56 4.60  4.57 4.96 4.94 5.80 
Electricity  1.72 4.74  4.91 5.25 5.42 5.72 
Water  0.20 4.42  4.64 4.80 5.02 5.41 
Construction  4.52 4.53  4.85 5.14 5.47 5.77 
Commerce  16.08  4.44  4.69 4.80 5.06 5.51 
Hotels  and  restaurants  5.86 4.26  4.46 4.60 4.80 5.35 
Transportation  8.50 4.36  4.55 4.76 4.96 5.42 
Communication  1.36 4.18  4.39 4.48 4.70 5.20 
Financial  services  2.11 4.39  4.58 4.71 4.91 5.44 
Real  estate  9.37 4.59  4.77 5.03 5.22 5.76 
Domestic  services  5.24 4.22  4.41 4.60 4.79 5.43 
Government  6.09 4.13  4.37 4.63 4.88 5.22 
Maquila  8.14 6.24  6.29 7.60 7.65 7.19 
Source: Authors’ worksheets 
*Initial share of total exports, imports, and production 
** FDI is foreign direct investment.  23
The Impact of CAFTA on Factor Markets 
The impact of the CAFTA simulations on the growth rates of capital and employment is then broken 
down by skill level, gender, and place of residence, (rural or urban)(Table 8). Recall that our definition of 
skill is based on the level of education: all workers with a high school education or more are classified as 
skilled.  The first thing to note is that employment is higher for all types of labor in the CAFTA 
simulation (tariff reduction). CAFTA increases employment, both rural and urban, for both males and 
females. MAQUILA has a very different effect. It dramatically increases the demand for female unskilled 
labor. When the maquila and tariff reduction effects are combined in the ALLCAFTA simulation, the 
general patterns are somewhat damped but still survive. Because of maquila, the growth rate of 
employment under ALLCAFTA is especially favorable to the unskilled.  
What about rural versus urban labor?  Obviously the rate of growth of rural employment is slower 
than urban, particularly for unskilled labor. But comparing the base with the CAFTA simulations, we see 
that in the base rural unskilled employment increases by a bit less than 5 percent per year. But what is of 
more interest here is that, in the ALLCAFTA simulation, the growth rate of employment of unskilled 
labor in the rural sector is about 0.7 percentage points faster than in the base, and almost 0.1 percentage 
point higher in the urban sector, thanks largely to the increase of employment of women in the maquila 
industry. By 2020 those differences in growth rates translate into an increase of more than 15 percent in 
rural and more than 19 percent in urban unskilled employment.   We conclude that CAFTA will be 
beneficial to the unskilled. It has an urban bias to be sure, but that is primarily because of the maquila 
effect on employment of unskilled female labor. Rural labor will also share in the benefits of CAFTA—
how much depends on the extent of the rural or urban bias of the CAFTA agreement. Our results say that 
while more job opportunities will open up in the urban area than the rural under CAFTA, both areas gain. 
Employment of skilled labor also grows faster under CAFTA, but as we shall see in a moment, most of 
the gains for skilled labor come in the form of wage increases rather than job creation.   24
Table 8. Growth rates of capital and labor by gender and skill 
 Base  CAFTA  Maquila  All  CAFTA  FDI* 
  (Annual percentage growth rate 2000-2020) 
USKLM  2.844 2.997 3.157 3.314 3.599 
USKLF  3.019 3.152 3.426 3.560 3.704 
RSKLF  2.876 3.016 3.231 3.375 3.625 
RSKLF  2.924 3.047 3.272 3.398 3.580 
UUSKLM  5.035 5.283 5.594 5.846 6.179 
UUSKLF  5.850 5.999 6.666 6.812 6.482 
RUSKLM  4.528 4.760 5.016 5.255 5.657 
RUSKLF  5.241 5.453 5.738 5.952 6.214 
CAP  3.140 3.299 3.552 3.717 4.239 
Source: Authors’ worksheets 
*FDI is foreign direct investment. 
Notes: USKLM is urban male skilled labor. 
USKLF is urban female skilled labor. 
UUSKLM is urban unskilled male labor. 
UUSKLF is urban unskilled female labor. 
RSKLM is rural skilled male labor. 
RSKLF is rural skilled female labor. 
RUSKLM is rural unskilled male labor. 
RUSKLF is rural unskilled female. 
CAP is capital stock. 
The Impact of CAFTA on Capital Formation 
In a dynamic simulation, what happens to investment and the capital stock is a key part of the explanation 
of the impact of any policy or exogenous change in conditions. We saw earlier that tariff cuts by 
themselves increase the growth rate of investment (Table 5). That is reflected in a terminal-year capital 
stock 3.3 percent higher than the base run. Maquila increases the rate of growth of capital formation and 
leads to a terminal-year capital stock that is 8.5 percent higher than the base run.  
The really big impact here is seen in the FDI simulation. Under FDI, the initial investment share 
rises by about 2.5 percent of GDP. More important, the rate of growth of investment rises by 35 percent 
(from 4.35 to 5.91 percent (Table 5). Those two changes raise the investment share from 17 percent in the 
base year 2000 to 22 percent in 2020, and they increase the quantity of capital available to the economy in 
year 2020 by about one-third. We have already seen the effect of that on the overall growth rate. Here the 
table shows the impact of all that investment on employment. It helps labor in every category. For 
unskilled labor, the increased demand is reflected in a big increase in the growth rate of employment. For 
skilled labor, assuming a positively sloped supply curve, some of the impact of increased demand comes 
in the form of more employment and some comes in higher wages. In either case, the FDI simulation 
underlines the critical role of capital formation in any growth scenario. We do not have a behavioral 
explanation for investment, so this simulation should be interpreted as a warning that the success or  25
failure of CAFTA is likely to depend on whether or not it helps governments to create conditions that 
encourage both foreign and domestic investment. 
Labor Earnings Inequality 
Our results suggest that there will be a significant rise in earnings inequality, with or without CAFTA 
(Table 9). That is at least partly because we are assuming that there is an excess supply of unskilled labor 
or equivalently that the real wage for both rural and urban unskilled labor is fixed over the entire 20-year 
simulation.  We assume that the supply curve of skilled labor, for both rural and urban and both sexes, 
rises by 2 percent per year, which is less than the increase in the demand for skilled labor. As a result, real 
wages for the skilled rise in all of the simulations, including the baseline. Since wages for the unskilled 
are fixed by the assumption of an excess supply of labor, the relative wage of the unskilled declines. In 
the baseline projection, by 2020 the relative wage of unskilled males in the urban sector falls about 37 
percent relative to the wage of the skilled, and the relative wage of unskilled females falls by 36 percent. 
Both of those differentials widen a bit in favor of the skilled  in all the alternative CAFTA scenarios. The 
faster the economy grows, the wider the skill differential becomes, which is what one would expect from 
the assumptions about the supply curves of the two types of labor. As for the urban–rural wage 
differentials, it is assumed to be constant for unskilled labor of both sexes, and therefore it is not shown in 
Table 9. The last rows of the table show the urban–rural differential for skilled males, which narrows 
slightly in all the scenarios.  
What can we conclude from all of this?  Even without CAFTA, the table tells us that the wage 
pyramid will become more unequal. Growth in whatever form will drive up the wages of the skilled. 
CAFTA slightly exaggerates that trend because it increases the growth rate. That does not mean 
necessarily that CAFTA favors the skilled. Rather it increases the growth rate of employment of the 
unskilled and the wages of the skilled. CAFTA increases the earnings of both the skilled and the 
unskilled, but for the latter the improvements come in the form of more jobs at the same wage, while for 
the former the improvement comes from both higher wages and more jobs.   26
Table 9. Relative wages 
   Initial 2005 2010 2015 2020 
USKLM/UUKLM        
BASE      1.09 1.15 1.23 1.33 1.45 
TARCUT1   1.09  1.16 1.24 1.34 1.47 
MAQUILA   1.09  1.16 1.25 1.36 1.49 
ALLCAFTA  1.09  1.17 1.26 1.37 1.52 
FDI       1.09  1.18 1.28 1.41 1.56 
       
USKLF/UUKLF       
BASE      1.11 1.19 1.27 1.38 1.51 
TARCUT1   1.11  1.19 1.28 1.39 1.53 
MAQUILA   1.11  1.20 1.30 1.42 1.57 
ALL CAFTA  1.11  1.20 1.31 1.43 1.59 
FDI       1.11  1.20 1.31 1.45 1.62 
       
RSKLM/RUKLM       
BASE      1.10 1.16 1.25 1.35 1.47 
TARCUT1   1.10  1.17 1.25 1.36 1.49 
MAQUILA   1.10  1.18 1.27 1.38 1.52 
ALLCAFTA  1.10  1.18 1.28 1.40 1.54 
FDI       1.10  1.19 1.30 1.43 1.58 
       
RSKLF/RUKLF       
BASE      1.12 1.18 1.27 1.37 1.49 
TARCUT1   1.12 1.18 1.27 1.38 1.51 
MAQUILA   1.11 1.19 1.29 1.41 1.55 
ALLCAFTA  1.11 1.20 1.29 1.42 1.57 
FDI       1.11 1.20 1.31 1.44 1.59 
       
USKLM/USKLF       
BASE      0.98 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 
TARCUT1   0.98 0.97  0.97 0.97 0.96 
MAQUILA   0.98 0.97  0.96 0.96 0.96 
ALLCAFTA  0.98 0.97  0.96 0.96 0.95 
FDI       0.99 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 
       
USKLM/RSKLM       
BASE      0.990 0.990 0.990 0.988 0.987 
TARCUT1   0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.988 
MAQUILA   0.991 0.987 0.986 0.985 0.983 
ALLCAFTA  0.991 0.988 0.987 0.985 0.984 
FDI       0.993 0.992 0.990 0.989 0.987 
Source: Authors’ worksheets 
Note: TARCUT1 stands for tariff cut.  27
Factor Shares 
One important implication of the evidence shown so far is that CAFTA appears to be favorable to 
unskilled labor despite the widening of the skill differential. This is confirmed in the changes in factor 
shares displayed in Table 10. The share of unskilled labor rises in every scenario and the capital share 
falls in every scenario. In the MAQUILA and FDI scenarios, increases are large in the capital stock, 
output, and the employment of unskilled labor. The latter two increases are so large that the shares of both 
capital and unskilled labor rise, at the expense of skilled labor. Note that this happens even though the 
increase in the skill differential in both of these scenarios is large.  
Table 10. Factor shares (%of GDP at factor cost) 
  2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Unskilled labor       
BASE      0.168 0.173 0.179 0.185 0.191 
CAFTA  0.168 0.173 0.179 0.185 0.191 
MAQUILA   0.167 0.176 0.182 0.189 0.197 
ALLCAFTA  0.167 0.176 0.182 0.189 0.196 
FDI       0.164 0.171 0.177 0.183 0.190 
       
Skilled labor       
BASE      0.187 0.186 0.186 0.184 0.182 
CAFTA  0.187  0.187 0.185 0.184 0.182 
MAQUILA   0.187  0.189 0.188 0.186 0.184 
ALLCAFTA  0.187  0.189 0.188 0.186 0.184 
FDI       0.187  0.190 0.188 0.186 0.184 
       
Capital       
BASE      0.645 0.641 0.636 0.631 0.627 
CAFTA  0.645 0.640 0.636 0.632 0.627 
MAQUILA   0.647 0.635 0.630 0.625 0.620 
ALLCAFTA  0.647 0.634 0.629 0.625 0.620 
FDI       0.648 0.639 0.635 0.631 0.627 
Total  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Source:  Authors’ worksheets  28
7.  THE IMPACT OF CAFTA ON POVERTY AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 
The dynamic CGE model estimates CAFTA’s effects on employment, production, and income. What are 
the implications of those changes for poverty and the distribution of income?  To answer this question, we 
have to find a way to translate labor market outcomes of the CGE into distribution of income across 
households. This is difficult because the CGE tells us about employment creation and wages for 
individuals, but for distributional and poverty purposes, those individuals must be treated as members of 
households. Thus, if a certain number of additional jobs have been created, we need a way of deciding 
which formerly unemployed individuals will get those jobs, and which families they come from. Exactly 
the same type of question arises when we consider the effect of a change in the skill composition of the 
labor force. For example, the CGE may tell us that the skilled labor force has increased. We then need 
some way of deciding which members of which families are upgraded.  
Here we will follow a microsimulation methodology developed by Vos, Taylor, and Paes de 
Barros (2002). In the procedure, a household survey as close as possible to the base year of the CGE is 
used to get a base-period distribution of the labor force across the households represented in the survey
12.  
In the first step, the labor force is divided among the various skills represented in the CGE model, and 
rates of unemployment for each are calculated. Then random numbers are assigned to the group that will 
shrink in size, and that group is ranked according to the random numbers. Thus, for example, if the model 
calls for an increase in employment, random numbers are assigned to the unemployed. Then the 
procedure moves down the ranked list of the unemployed until a sufficient number have been found to 
reach the amount of employment given by the CGE solution. Then, working with the newly simulated 
labor force by type, one repeats the procedure to change the skill or sectoral composition of that labor 
force. At a final stage, the wage of the new labor force with the composition determined by the CGE 
solution is changed in accordance with it. At this point, the new labor force with the new wage structure is 
reassembled into the households from the base-period survey and new levels of household income per 
capita as well as poverty and income distribution statistics are calculated.   
Two things should be noted about this procedure. First, the selection of individuals to move from 
one labor category to another is entirely random, not based on any behavioral model. This is not very 
satisfactory from a theoretical point of view. To remedy that defect, the procedure is replicated 50 or 100 
times and the statistical results tabulated. This is intended to test the validity or sensitivity of the results to 
the particular choice of individuals who are moved from a contracting to an expanding group. We can 
then report not only the mean of the various trials, but also the standard errors and confidence intervals. In 
the El Salvador case, we repeated these simulations 100 times. The second thing to note is that the 
                                                      
12We used the household survey of 2005.  29
solution we are proposing is sequential. That is, we start with unemployment and adjust it to get the new 
labor force determined by the CGE model, and then change the sector and skill level of that new labor 
force and finally the wage. This seems like the right order, but it is possible that the solution would be 
different if we had chosen a different sequence of changes.  
An overview of the results of our microsimulations shows various poverty and distribution 
statistics and standard errors for the baseline and each of the four alternate scenarios reported in previous 
sections of this paper (Table 11).  For the base, we started from a 2005 household survey from that year, 
and then did the microsimulations for the year 2020, based on changes in employment, participation rates, 
unemployment, and changes in relative wages determined by the results of the CGE simulation. The table 
reports average labor and per capita income, distribution statistics, and poverty incidence, the poverty gap 
and poverty severity for both extreme and moderate poverty, where the  poverty lines for each measure 
were calculated by  Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social in El Salvador.  30  31
Table 11. Changes in poverty and distribution under CAFTA, 2020  
   2005  Baseline Tariff  Cut  Maquila  All  CAFTA  FDI 
   (Base  year)  Mean  S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. 
National               
Labor income  222.3 222.3 0.0  221.7  0.1  222.2  0.1  222.4  0.1  224.1  0.1 
Theil – labor income  0.69 0.70  0.00  0.70  0.00  0.70  0.00  0.70  0.00  0.70  0.00 
Gini – labor income  0.56 0.56  0.00  0.56  0.00  0.56  0.00  0.57  0.00  0.57  0.00 
Per capita household income  104.7 140.9 0.0  146.0  0.0  151.3  0.1  155.4  0.1  159.6  0.1 
Poverty incidence  40.2% 23.6%  0.4%  21.5%  0.3%  19.9%  0.4%  18.5%  0.4%  17.7%  0.3% 
Poverty gap  17.4% 8.8%  0.1%  7.9%  0.2%  7.1%  0.1%  6.6%  0.1%  6.2%  0.1% 
Poverty severity  10.5% 4.9%  0.1%  4.4%  0.1%  3.9%  0.1%  3.6%  0.1%  3.3%  0.1% 
External poverty incidence  15.5% 7.1%  0.2%  6.3%  0.3%  5.6%  0.2%  5.1%  0.2%  4.8%  0.2% 
External poverty gap  6.9% 3.0%  0.1%  2.6%  0.1%  2.3%  0.1%  2.1%  0.1%  1.9%  0.1% 
External poverty severity  4.5% 1.9%  0.1%  1.6%  0.1%  1.4%  0.1%  1.3%  0.1%  1.2%  0.1% 
Theil – per capita household income  0.49 0.40  0.00  0.39  0.00  0.38  0.00  0.37  0.00  0.37  0.00 
Gini – per capita household income  0.50 0.46  0.00  0.45  0.00  0.45  0.00  0.45  0.00  0.45  0.00 
                       
Rural                      
Labor income  137.2 153.3 0.9  154.8  0.9  156.1  1.1  157.4  1.1  158.4  1.0 
Theil – labor income  0.72 0.67  0.00  0.67  0.01  0.66  0.01  0.66  0.00  0.66  0.01 
Gini – labor income  0.55 0.55  0.00  0.55  0.00  0.55  0.00  0.55  0.00  0.55  0.00 
Per capita household income  61.6 93.3  0.6  98.0  0.6  102.3  0.8  105.7  0.7  108.4  0.7 
Poverty incidence  44.4% 23.3%  0.6%  20.8%  0.6%  18.9%  0.7%  17.4%  0.6%  16.5%  0.6% 
Poverty gap  20.0% 9.2%  0.3%  8.1%  0.3%  7.2%  0.2%  6.5%  0.2%  6.1%  0.2% 
Poverty severity  12.4% 5.3%  0.2%  4.6%  0.2%  4.1%  0.2%  3.7%  0.2%  3.5%  0.2% 
External poverty incidence  18.6% 7.8%  0.3%  6.8%  0.4%  5.9%  0.3%  5.4%  0.3%  5.0%  0.3% 
External poverty gap  8.4% 3.3%  0.2%  2.9%  0.2%  2.5%  0.1%  2.3%  0.1%  2.1%  0.1% 
External poverty severity  5.4% 2.1%  0.1%  1.8%  0.1%  1.6%  0.1%  1.4%  0.1%  1.3%  0.1% 
Theil – per capita household income  0.43 0.33  0.00  0.32  0.01  0.31  0.01  0.30  0.00  0.30  0.01 
Gini – per capita household income  0.47 0.43  0.00  0.42  0.00  0.41  0.00  0.41  0.00  0.41  0.00 
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Table 11. Continued 
   2005  Baseline Tariff  Cut  Maquila  All  CAFTA  FDI 
   (Base  year)  Mean  S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. 
Urban                      
Labor income  272.1 265.3 0.6  263.6  0.6  263.7  0.7  263.3  0.7  265.4  0.7 
Theil – labor income  0.61 0.66  0.00  0.66  0.00  0.66  0.00  0.67  0.00  0.67  0.00 
Gini – labor income  0.53 0.55  0.00  0.55  0.00  0.56  0.00  0.56  0.00  0.56  0.00 
Per capita household income  133.6 172.7 0.4  178.1  0.4  184.1  0.5  188.7  0.5  193.8  0.5 
Poverty incidence  37.5% 23.8%  0.5%  22.0%  0.4%  20.5%  0.4%  19.3%  0.4%  18.5%  0.4% 
Poverty gap  15.6% 8.6%  0.2%  7.8%  0.2%  7.1%  0.2%  6.6%  0.2%  6.2%  0.2% 
Poverty severity  9.2% 4.7%  0.1%  4.2%  0.1%  3.8%  0.1%  3.5%  0.1%  3.3%  0.1% 
External poverty incidence  13.5% 6.7%  0.3%  5.9%  0.3%  5.4%  0.3%  4.9%  0.2%  4.6%  0.3% 
External poverty gap  5.9% 2.7%  0.1%  2.4%  0.1%  2.1%  0.1%  1.9%  0.1%  1.8%  0.1% 
External poverty severity  3.8% 1.7%  0.1%  1.5%  0.1%  1.4%  0.1%  1.2%  0.1%  1.1%  0.1% 
Theil – per capita household income  0.43 0.37  0.00  0.36  0.00  0.35  0.00  0.35  0.00  0.35  0.00 
Gini – per capita household income  0.47 0.44  0.00  0.44  0.00  0.44  0.00  0.43  0.00  0.43  0.00 
Source:  Authors’ worksheets 
Note: SE is standard error. 33
As we have already seen, the CGE model predicts a fairly optimistic and significant increase of 
34 percent in per capita income between 2005 and 2020 in El Salvador, even without CAFTA. The 
impact is large and favorable for both urban  and rural poverty, but especially rural. At the national level, 
the 34 percent increase in per capita income causes poverty to fall by 41 percent, which implies an 
income–poverty elasticity of –1.20.   The impact of growth on rural and extreme poverty is even  larger. 
Rural household income rises faster than urban (52 percen, compared with 29 percent) and that causes 
rural poverty to fall at an even faster rate than urban poverty. These results all come from the rapid rate of 
growth of rural employment generated by our macro model. Agricultural production rises faster than 
urban services, and since we have assumed no increase in productivity, this translates into rapid increases 
in rural employment. With the number of jobs in the countryside growing about 4.7 percent per year, and 
the rural population only growing by 2.5 percent per year, the increase in participation rates and earning 
opportunities for rural families is large, thus moving a substantial number above the poverty line.   
Because of the rapid increase in employment of the unskilled forecast in all the alternative 
scenarios, including the baseline, the model predicts a significant reduction in income inequality. At the 
national level, inequality in the baseline falls because of the narrowing of rural–urban income 
differentials. But it also falls within both the rural and the urban sectors, considered separately.  
One may well question the accuracy of these predictions, but what is of greater importance to us 
here, is the impact of CAFTA on the projections. Whatever error may be in the baseline projections, there 
is no reason to think that there will be a relationship between the CAFTA projections and an unknown 
error in the baseline. Therefore, the difference between the CAFTA forecasts and the baseline should be a 
robust estimate of the impact of CAFTA.  
Consider now what the changes in poverty and distribution estimates across the simulations tell 
us about the impact of CAFTA, first comparing tariffcut to the baseline. The tariffcut column shows the 
impact of the tariff reductions alone, separate from all the other components of the treaty. The tariff 
reductions are favorable both to rural and to urban families. Employment and per capita income rise in 
both rural and urban areas, while poverty and extreme poverty fall. Contrary to the expectations of some 
observers, CAFTA’s impact is particularly favorable in the rural area. According to these estimates,  per 
capita household income increases about 5 percent, compared to 3  percent in the urban area.   
This result may seem surprising because of the reduction of tariffs on some agricultural 
commodities, but that ignores three things. First, the average level of tariffs prior to CAFTA was already 
quite low (see Table 1). Second, tariffs on sensitive products were reduced slowly and carefully (see 
Table 3). Third, increases in income cause indirect increases in household demand for agricultural 
commodities, which (according to the simulations) offsets the unfavorable direct impact of reduced 
protection.   34
Not only does the tariff reduction under CAFTA help the poor, it also slightly improves the 
distribution of income. Compare the Gini coefficients for per capita household income in the CAFTA 
column with those in the baseline. Both the rural and the national Theils and Ginis fall by one percentage 
point, and all these changes are statistically significant. This is an important and somewhat surprising 
result. Recall that in the CAFTA scenario the rate of growth of skilled employment increases slightly over 
the baseline and so does the relative wage of the skilled (Table 9). Those changes are small, which is why 
the distribution of labor income is the same in both the baseline and tariff cut scenarios. At the household 
level, the additional wages from increased employment adds of formerly unemployed unskilled workers 
increases household income enough at the bottom of the income pyramid to more than offset the absolute 
gains in employment and wages for the skilled.  
Maquila is even more favorable to the poor than trade liberalization, particularly for the urban 
sector. Because the increase in the demand for female unskilled labor is very large as are demand-side 
linkages, the boom in this sector spreads, increasing demand and employment throughout the economy. 
Rural and urban poverty both fall, the former by an even greater amount than the latter. This merely 
underlines two features of poverty reduction in El Salvador. The first is the critical sensitivity of poverty 
to employment growth, particularly for the unskilled. Any development strategy that successfully creates 
employment for this group will have a large and favorable impact on poverty. The second feature is the 
linkage between the rural and the urban sectors. If the economy creates urban employment that pulls 
unemployed or inactive workers out of the countryside at the same time that the rise in urban employment 
and income increases the demand for agricultural production by urban households, the impact on rural 
poverty will be favorable.  
Maquila not only has a favorable impact on poverty rates, both rural and urban, it also reduces 
inequality. At the national level, the Gini falls from 0.46 in the baseline to 0.45. One reason for this is that 
under maquila the difference between urban and rural households’ average income narrows. This happens 
in spite of the fact that maquila itself is an urban activity. This is just one more reminder of the 
importance of the linkage between the urban and rural labor markets for the unskilled. Rapid employment 
growth for the urban unskilled lifts incomes throughout the economy. For the unskilled the gains come in 
the form of more jobs at the same wage. For the skilled, the rise in labor demand is satisfied partially by 
an increase in employment but also by an increase in relative wages. That is why the urban Gini for labor 
income rises relative to the baseline. This also explains why poverty can be reduced at the same time 
labor income inequality rises, particularly in the urban sector.  
In the next scenario, ALLCAFTA combines the tariff cuts with access to the maquila market. As 
we have seen, both trade liberalization and maquila reduce poverty. When we measure their joint impact, 
the results are roughly equal to the sum of the effects considered separately. In the ALLCAFTA  35
simulation, poverty at the national level falls by 5  percentage points relative to the baseline. The bulk 
comes from maquila and the rest from trade liberalization.  If we look at the rural and urban impacts 
separately, we find that in relative terms trade liberalization is more helpful to the rural poor, while 
maquila has a bigger impact on the urban poor. Altogether urban poverty falls by 4.5 percentage points, of 
which 3.3 percentage points or more than two-thirds comes from maquila. But even so, because of the 
spread effects of faster employment growth for the unskilled, rural poverty falls further (5.9 percentage 
points) than urban, so that the reduction in rural poverty due to maquila is actually larger than the 
reduction in urban poverty.    
The changes in poverty and distribution presented in Table 11 for the different scenarios are the 
result of changes in employment, in the skill composition of the employed labor force, and in relative 
wages. We use microsimulation methodology to get an idea of how important each of these changes is to 
the final observed changes in Table 11.  
The microsimulation procedure is a way of estimating the poverty and distributional impact of the 
changes in the labor market determined by a CGE equilibrium solution, including changes in 
unemployment, labor force structure or skill composition, and relative wages.  Since these changes are 
made sequentially, we can make a quasi- decomposition of the overall changes in poverty or distribution, 
according to poverty and distribution statistics calculated separately at each stage of the microsimulation. 
In other words, we can ask what the poverty or distribution level would have been if the overall 
employment growth had been as it was in the CGE solution but with labor force structure and relative 
wages held constant. We can repeat this same procedure at each step of the microsimulation and calculate 
the changes in poverty and distribution resulting from the particular change in the labor market solution 
(Table 12). We are calling this a “quasi-decomposition” because one cannot build up to the final CGE 
solution in this way. The CGE was not asked to determine the rate of growth of total employment, 
holding labor force structure constant. If it had been, almost certainly the overall rate of growth of 
employment would have been lower than the one determined by the CGE. We can ask what the effect on 
poverty is of a change in total employment, holding the labor force structure constant, but that is not a 
CGE solution nor is it a part of the CGE solution. Indeed the whole point of the CGE is that overall 
growth will almost certainly involve changes in labor force structure and relative wages. Having said this, 
it is still instructive to make this quasi-decomposition to get an idea of which of the various changes in the 
labor market seem to have had the biggest impact on poverty and its distribution.  
In Table 12, there are three columns for each of the scenarios for the year 2020. The first, labeled 
E, gives the results coming from employment growth alone, holding both the skill composition and 
relative wages at their 2005 levels. It applies the rate of growth of total employment in each scenario to 
each category of labor. For example, in the baseline scenario, total employment grows at 4.9 percent per  36
year between 2005 and 2020. The E column shows what would happen to poverty and the distribution of 
income if that rate had been applied to all categories of employment. The microsimulation adjusts the 
participation rate and the unemployment rate for each type of labor until the overall average rate of 
growth of employment is reached. It then applies the base-period wage rate to each class of workers and 
calculates the poverty and distribution statistics. 
The second column, labeled S, changes the skill composition of the employed labor force so that 
in 2020 the rate of growth by skill category and gender of the labor force is consistent with the CGE 
model solution for 2020. In this case the microsimulation brings enough workers out of unemployment or 
inactivity to reach the rate of growth of employment for each skill class generated by the CGE model for 
2020. It assigns to each new worker the average wage by skill observed in the base year. Finally, the 
column labeled W shows the effect of changing relative wages by giving each of the workers in the S or 
skill level solution the wage shown in the CGE solution for 2020, rather than the one from the base year. 
The W columns for each scenario are identical to the columns for 2020 in Table 11.  
The first point to be gleaned from Table 12 is the key role employment growth plays for the 
unskilled in alleviating poverty. Look first at the tariff cut column. It shows the effect of trade 
liberalization alone. Trade liberalization increased the average employment growth rate from 4.9 percent 
in the base line to 5.1 percent. The small increase is enough to reduce the national poverty rate from 24.5 
percent in the base line to 23.2 percent. In all of the simulations, employment growth for the unskilled is 
higher than for the skilled. That means that in the columns marked S, the growth rate of employment of 
unskilled labor is higher than the growth rate under column E. The effect of that differential growth rate 
can be seen in the columns labeled S, where we permit differential growth rates of employment by skill. 
Not surprisingly, in almost every case, the poverty rates in the S column are lower than they are in the 
corresponding E columns, reflecting the close connection between poverty and employment growth for 
the unskilled.
13  In the tariff cut simulation, the difference in poverty rates between the S and E columns is 
particularly large. That says that trade liberalization by itself favors the unskilled. Faster-than-average 
growth in jobs for this group reduces the national poverty rate by 1.4 percentage points relative to what it 
would have been if all skill categories had grown at the same rate.  
Overall employment growth plays an even greater role in the total poverty reduction in all the 
other scenarios simply because they all have higher rates of growth than trade liberalization alone. That is 
particularly clear in the maquila scenario. From the E column in that scenario, we find that employment 
growth by itself reduces the national poverty rate by 3.8 percentage points relative to what it is expected 
to be in 2020 in the baseline. In all the scenarios, changes in skill structure and wage differentials do 
                                                      
13 The exception is ALLCAFTA where the poverty rates are approximately equal.  37
reduce the poverty rates a bit more than employment growth alone, but still the latter comprises at least 90 
percent of the total amount of poverty reduction from each of those simulations.  
If we now look at the effect of permitting the rise in wage differentials generated by the CGE 
model to feed through into household incomes, we find that in every case the impact is positive. Rising 
wage differentials actually reduce poverty relative to what it would have been with the simulated 
employment growth rates differentiated by skill. This is true in every scenario. Since the model assumes a 
constant real wage for the unskilled, this pattern has to mean that there are either significant numbers of 
skilled workers in poor households, or that poor households earn some of their income from either family 
farms or informal urban activities part of which are returns to capital, the quantity of which rises in each 
of our scenarios.  
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Table 12. Decomposition of CAFTA Effects, 2020 
     Baseline Tariff  Cut Maquila AllCAFTA  FDI 
   2005  Mean  Mean Mean Mean Mean 
National    E S W E S W  E S W E S W E S W 
Labor  income  222.3 215.2 210.1 222.3 214.9 209.3 221.7 214.7 209.0 222.2 213.7 208.7 222.4 212.3 209.2 224.1 
Theil-  labor  income  0.69 0.66 0.65 0.70 0.66 0.65 0.70 0.65 0.65 0.70 0.65 0.64 0.70 0.65 0.64 0.70 
Gini-  labor  income  0.56 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.57 0.55 0.55 0.57 
Per  capita  household  income  104.7 135.8 133.8 140.9 139.1 138.4 146.0 146.0 143.0 151.3 150.6 146.5 155.4 150.2 149.6 159.6 
Poverty incidence  40.2%  24.5%  23.9%  23.6%  23.2%  21.8%  21.5%  20.7%  20.1%  19.9%  18.7%  18.8%  18.5%  18.5%  17.9%  17.7% 
Poverty  gap  17.4% 9.2% 8.9% 8.8% 8.6% 7.9% 7.9% 7.5% 7.2% 7.1% 6.6% 6.6% 6.6% 6.5% 6.3% 6.2% 
Poverty  severity  10.5% 5.2% 5.0% 4.9% 4.8% 4.4% 4.4% 4.1% 3.9% 3.9% 3.6% 3.6% 3.6% 3.5% 3.4% 3.3% 
External poverty incidence  15.5%  7.5%  7.2%  7.1%  6.9%  6.3% 6.3% 5.9% 5.6% 5.6% 5.1% 5.1% 5.1% 5.0% 4.8% 4.8% 
External  poverty  gap  6.9% 3.1% 3.0% 3.0% 2.9% 2.6% 2.6% 2.5% 2.3% 2.3% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.0% 2.0% 1.9% 
External poverty severity  4.5%  2.0%  1.9%  1.9%  1.8%  1.7% 1.6% 1.6% 1.5% 1.4% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.2% 1.2% 
Theil-  per  capita  household  income  0.49 0.38 0.36 0.40 0.37 0.35 0.39 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.37 0.34 0.33 0.37 
Gini-  per  capita  household  income  0.50 0.45 0.44 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.45 
                                           
Rural                                           
Labor  income  137.2 151.8 151.4 153.3 153.1 152.8 154.8 155.2 154.0 156.1 156.1 155.2 157.4 155.9 155.9 158.4 
Theil-  labor  income  0.72 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.66 
Gini-  labor  income  0.55 0.55 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.55 
Per  capita  household  income  61.6  90.7  92.1  93.3  93.9  96.6  98.0  99.9 100.7 102.3 104.2 104.1 105.7 104.7 106.5 108.4 
Poverty incidence  44.4%  24.6%  23.4%  23.3%  22.9%  20.9%  20.8%  20.0%  19.0%  18.9%  17.8%  17.5%  17.4%  17.5%  16.6%  16.5% 
Poverty  gap  20.0% 9.8% 9.2% 9.2% 9.0% 8.1% 8.1% 7.7% 7.2% 7.2% 6.7% 6.6% 6.5% 6.6% 6.2% 6.1% 
Poverty  severity  12.4% 5.7% 5.3% 5.3% 5.2% 4.7% 4.6% 4.4% 4.1% 4.1% 3.8% 3.7% 3.7% 3.7% 3.5% 3.5% 
External poverty incidence  18.6%  8.3%  7.8%  7.8%  7.6%  6.8% 6.8% 6.4% 6.0% 5.9% 5.5% 5.5% 5.4% 5.4% 5.1% 5.0% 
External  poverty  gap  8.4% 3.6% 3.4% 3.3% 3.3% 2.9% 2.9% 2.7% 2.5% 2.5% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.1% 2.1% 
External poverty severity  5.4%  2.3%  2.1%  2.1%  2.1%  1.8% 1.8% 1.7% 1.6% 1.6% 1.5% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.3% 1.3% 
Theil-  per  capita  household  income  0.43 0.26 0.24 0.33 0.26 0.24 0.32 0.26 0.24 0.31 0.26 0.24 0.30 0.25 0.24 0.30 
Gini  –  per  capita  household  income  0.47 0.43 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.41 
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Table 12. Continued 
     Baseline Tariff  Cut Maquila AllCAFTA  FDI 
   2005  Mean  Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Urban                                           
Labor  income  272.1 253.9 246.8 265.3 252.7 244.6 263.6 251.3 243.6 263.7 249.2 242.4 263.3 247.2 242.7 265.4 
Theil-  labor  income  0.61 0.61 0.61 0.66 0.61 0.61 0.66 0.61 0.61 0.66 0.61 0.61 0.67 0.61 0.61 0.67 
Gini-  labor  income  0.53 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.56 0.53 0.53 0.56 0.54 0.53 0.56 
Per  capita  household  income  133.6 165.9 161.8 172.7 169.3 166.4 178.1 176.8 171.3 184.1 181.7 174.9 188.7 180.6 178.4 193.8 
Poverty incidence  37.5%  24.5%  24.2%  23.8%  23.4%  22.4%  22.0%  21.2%  20.9%  20.5%  19.3%  19.6%  19.3%  19.1%  18.8%  18.5% 
Poverty  gap  15.6% 8.8% 8.7% 8.6% 8.3% 7.8% 7.8% 7.4% 7.2% 7.1% 6.5% 6.7% 6.6% 6.4% 6.3% 6.2% 
Poverty  severity  9.2% 4.8% 4.7% 4.7% 4.5% 4.2% 4.2% 4.0% 3.8% 3.8% 3.4% 3.5% 3.5% 3.4% 3.3% 3.3% 
External poverty incidence  13.5%  6.9%  6.7%  6.7%  6.5%  5.9% 5.9% 5.7% 5.4% 5.4% 4.9% 4.9% 4.9% 4.7% 4.6% 4.6% 
External  poverty  gap  5.9% 2.8% 2.7% 2.7% 2.6% 2.4% 2.4% 2.3% 2.2% 2.1% 1.9% 2.0% 1.9% 1.9% 1.8% 1.8% 
External poverty severity  3.8%  1.8%  1.7%  1.7%  1.6%  1.5% 1.5% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.1% 
Theil-  per  capita  household  income  0.43 0.35 0.33 0.37 0.34 0.32 0.36 0.33 0.31 0.35 0.32 0.31 0.35 0.31 0.30 0.35 
Gini- per capita household income  0.47 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.43 0.41 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.43 
Source:  Author’s worksheets 
Notes: E is employment, S is skill, W is wage. FDI is foreign direct investment. 40
As we have already seen, the model forecasts a reduction in inequality. That is mainly due to the 
underlying employment trends of the baseline, slightly amplified by CAFTA itself. Table 12 allows us to 
separate the effects of the changes in employment from the changes in relative wages forecast by the 
model. The message from the table is clear. Trade liberalization by itself has a relatively small impact on 
employment and growth. But that impact is progressive. At both the national and rural levels, the Gini 
falls by one percentage point, and urban–rural household income differentials narrow.  
In all the other simulations, the growth of the economy is higher than in the baseline and so is 
employment for the unskilled. No change in relative wages would have resulted in a further reduction in 
inequality. But faster growth, coupled with supply constraints for skilled labor, led to rising wage 
differentials in favor of skilled labor. That raised the Ginis and Theils in both subsectors and at the 
national level relative to the levels they would have reached with employment growth alone. But those 
regressive increases in relative earnings do not completely offset the favorable effects of rising 
employment for the unskilled, except for urban households in the maquila and tariff cut scenarios.  
The message here is that the positive effect of job creation on the distribution of income is greater 
than the associated rise in the skill differential. To put it another way, while it is likely that there will be a 
rise in the skill differential over the next 15 years, and while it may even widen slightly under CAFTA, 
the absolute gains in income at the bottom of the income pyramid under CAFTA more than offset the 
gains in wages for the skilled at the top. In short, CAFTA improves the distribution of income relative to 
the baseline. That is partly because a good part of the gain from CAFTA goes to the rural sector, and 
partly because the benefits to the poor of faster growth in jobs for the unskilled more than offsets the 
regressive effects of rising relative wages for the skilled.   41
8.  CONCLUSIONS 
Supporters of CAFTA hope that it will enhance growth prospects and reduce poverty in El Salvador. Our 
results suggest that while the effects of CAFTA on the growth rate and poverty are positive, they will be 
small unless the agreement affects the investment rate. Thanks to trade liberalization in the 1990s, tariff 
barriers were not high enough prior to CAFTA to have a large impact on growth when they are 
dismantled. Critics have complained that smallholders will be hurt by the removal of tariff protection for 
sensitive products such as corn, rice, beans, and pork that are produced and consumed by the poor. Our 
results do not support this view. Agriculture in general and subsistence agriculture in particular would 
both grow slightly faster under CAFTA than they could be expected to otherwise. The increases in the 
growth rate are not large, but they are positive. One reason for this is that the removal of tariff protection 
for these commodities under CAFTA will be cautious and gradual. Also we found that the rural–urban 
wage differential narrows slightly under each of the CAFTA scenarios because poverty falls further in the 
rural sector than it does in the urban.  
CAFTA in general and maquila in particular are good for both rural and urban unskilled labor in 
El Salvador.  Since we have assumed an excess supply of unskilled labor, wage differentials widen in 
favor of the skilled, which means that for unskilled labor the benefits of CAFTA are expressed in job 
creation rather than rising wages. CAFTA raises the employment growth rate for unskilled males by 0.3 
percent per year in the urban sector and by 0.2 percent in the rural sector; the increase is somewhat larger 
for female unskilled labor because of maquila. CAFTA also benefits skilled labor, but here much of the 
benefit comes in the form of rising wages as well as employment growth. While that means that the 
distribution of income is less equal than it would be without the associated rise in the skill differential, in 
no case did the rise in inequality fully offset the progressive effects of enhanced job creation due to 
CAFTA. With CAFTA, poverty declines and distribution improves slightly at the national level and to a 
more significant extent in the rural sector in all the scenarios relative to the baseline.  
In addition to trade liberalization, CAFTA includes significant benefits for foreign investors, in 
the hope that such inducements will increase the inflow of foreign capital to the country and in turn have 
a positive impact on production and employment. Our results support this position. If foreign direct 
investment really does increase in response to CAFTA to the degree that we have assumed in our CAFTA 
experiment, the impact on the Salvadorian economy will be substantial. Economic growth and 
employment of the unskilled would rise by roughly one-fourth, and while this may be an overly optimistic 
projection, it does point to the critical role of increasing the rate of capital formation and technical 
progress. To the extent that foreign capital can help to achieve this goal, it will provide a powerful push to 
growth and employment.   42
These simulations say something important about the growth process in a country like El 
Salvador in which it seems reasonable to assume that there is idle unskilled labor willing and able to work 
at a fixed real wage. In such an economy, growth can be increased in one of three ways. First, already 
employed resources can be moved to sectors where they are more productive. That is what the tariff 
reductions under CAFTA do, and the result is positive but small. Differences in factor productivity across 
protected and unprotected sectors are not large enough to have much of a growth impact. Second, the 
structure of demand can be changed in such a way as to increase the demand for previously unemployed 
unskilled labor. That is what the maquila simulation does, because maquila uses a lot of unskilled labor 
relative to skilled labor and capital. Increasing demand for the output of this sector makes the whole 
economy less skill-intensive. Better yet, the increase in the growth rate is virtually free, because some of 
the productive resources used were previously unemployed. That has a big impact on poverty and a  
smaller though positive effect on inequality. Finally, the supply of capital can be increased by increasing 
the rate of capital formation. That is what happens in the FDI simulation. Note however that any policy 
that increases the investment rate would have virtually the same positive effect on the growth rate.  43
APPENDIX A:  SUPPLEMENTARY TABLE 
Table A.1. Sectoral growth rate 
  
INITIAL 
SHARE  BASE CAFTA MAQUILA  ALL 
CAFTA  FDI 
 Sector  2000*  Annual Percentage growth rate (2000-2020) 
EXPORTS           
CCAFE      4.80 4.55  4.70  4.94 5.09  5.59 
CCEREAL    0.15 4.94  5.05  5.39 5.5  6.40 
CCARNE     0.35 5.34  5.44  5.79 5.9  7.11 
CSILV      0.02 5.32  5.28  5.87 5.83  7.46 
CPESCA     0.39 4.80  4.90  5.25 5.35  6.26 
CMINERIA   0.03 4.93  4.89  5.32 5.29  6.28 
CCARPROD   0.05 4.81  4.88  5.25 5.34  6.52 
CLACTEOS   0.08 4.77  4.86  5.09 5.2  6.28 
CTRIGPROD  1.08 4.56  4.75  4.84 5.03  5.75 
CAZUPROD   1.33 4.31  4.45  4.68 4.82  5.74 
COTHAGIND  3.77 4.00  4.11  4.36 4.47  5.28 
CBEBTAB    1.25 4.18  4.28  4.47 4.57  5.46 
CTEXTILES  10.04 4.85  5.00  5.05 5.21  6.10 
CINDUME    0.92 4.28  4.50  4.42 4.65  5.67 
CCUERO     0.43 4.53  4.57  4.85 4.89  6.18 
CMADERA    0.31 4.52  4.51  4.83 4.83  6.09 
CPAPEL     0.87 4.63  4.74  5.02 5.14  5.79 
CIMPRENTA  1.77 3.81  3.79  4.09 4.07  5.33 
CQUIMICOS  2.92 4.25  4.36  4.61 4.72  5.47 
CPETROLEO  3.66 3.68  3.86  4.08 4.27  4.91 
CPLASTICO  1.71 4.14  4.13  4.44 4.43  5.59 
CMINERALE  0.74 4.15  4.26  4.52 4.64  5.57 
CMETALES   5.10 5.14  5.21  5.45 5.54  6.34 
CMAQUIN    2.39 4.70  4.81  5.04 5.15  6.00 
CTRANSMAQ  3.10 4.37  4.32  4.64 4.61  5.89 
CELECT     0.23 4.66  4.82  5.13 5.3  5.66 
CCOMER     0.10 4.28  4.49  4.63 4.84  5.43 
CHOTYREST  4.66 4.24  4.41  4.58 4.76  5.41 
CTRANSP    9.00 4.28  4.46  4.67 4.85  5.40 
CCOMUN     2.11 4.11  4.30  4.40 4.6  5.20 
CSFINANC   0.14 4.47  4.63  4.77 4.94  5.56 
CINMVIV    0.55 4.58  4.72  4.99 5.14  5.91 
CSPERDOM   0.64 4.16  4.29  4.57 4.71  5.54 
CMAQUILA   35.28 6.24  6.29  7.60 7.65  7.19 
IMPORTS           
CCAFE      0.21 7.53  7.77  7.99 8.24  9.07 
CCEREAL    3.21 3.97  4.45  4.20 4.69  4.71 
COTHCROP   1.09 4.77  4.94  5.08 5.26  5.88 
CCARNE     0.44 3.72  4.23  3.98 4.50  4.36 
CSILV      0.13 4.27  5.58  4.53 5.85  4.94 
CPESCA     0.22 4.04  4.78  4.31 5.06  4.87 
CMINERIA   7.23 3.91  4.12  4.32 4.53  5.01  44
Table A.1. Continued 
  
INITIAL 
SHARE  BASE CAFTA MAQUILA  ALL 
CAFTA  FDI 
 Sector  2000*  Annual Percentage growth rate (2000-2020) 
CCARPROD   1.39 4.36  4.82  4.66 5.13  5.13 
CLACTEOS   1.51 4.16  4.60  4.45 4.91  4.95 
CTRIGPROD  1.38 4.21  4.63  4.52 4.95  5.05 
CAZUPROD   0.03 3.90  6.88  4.15 7.15  4.57 
COTHAGIND  3.45 4.59  5.03  4.90 5.35  5.44 
CBEBTAB    0.88 3.89  4.53  4.19 4.83  4.66 
CTEXTILES  2.67 4.13  5.30  4.44 5.63  5.00 
CINDUME    0.60 4.05  5.39  4.39 5.74  4.87 
CCUERO     1.10 4.03  4.79  4.33 5.10  4.78 
CMADERA    1.45 4.32  4.83  4.70 5.22  5.21 
CPAPEL     2.50 4.20  4.47  4.53 4.81  5.20 
CIMPRENTA  1.66 4.28  4.74  4.60 5.07  5.12 
CQUIMICOS  12.64 4.15  4.48  4.46 4.79  5.05 
CPETROLEO  7.91 4.32  4.63  4.67 4.99  5.24 
CPLASTICO  2.46 3.94  4.65  4.28 5.00  4.76 
CMINERALE  1.00 4.55  5.54  5.19 6.19  5.52 
CMETALES   5.77 4.26  4.75  4.75 5.25  5.35 
CMAQUIN    16.42 4.24  4.63  4.75 5.15  5.33 
CTRANSMAQ  8.54 4.22  4.83  4.68 5.30  5.22 
CELECT     1.09 5.09  5.28  5.74 5.94  5.96 
CCOMER     0.22 5.10  5.51  5.49 5.91  5.87 
CHOTYREST  1.80 4.42  4.82  4.68 5.09  4.91 
CTRANSP    2.49 4.89  5.22  5.40 5.73  5.52 
CCOMUN     0.56 4.59  4.94  4.95 5.30  5.23 
CSFINANC   1.89 4.00  4.33  4.42 4.76  4.81 
CINMVIV    4.62 4.67  5.02  5.23 5.58  4.99 
CSPERDOM   1.42 4.56  4.98  4.77 5.20  4.88 
CMAQUILA   0.01 4.35  4.67  -0.33  -0.02  5.19 
Source: Author’s worksheets. 
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APPENDIX B:  DOCUMENTATION OF THE SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MATRIX AND 
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY FOR EL SALVADOR AND TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF 
THE RECURSIVE DYNAMIC CGE 
The Social Accounting Matrix for 2000
14 
As noted in the paper, the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) used in this study is based on the 2000 SAM 
developed by Carlos Acevedo and described in Acevedo (2005). This SAM distinguishes between 
accounts for “activities” (the entities that carry out production) and “commodities” (markets for goods 
and services). The receipts are valued at producer prices in the activity accounts and at market prices in 
the commodity accounts (i.e. including indirect commodity taxes and transaction costs). Activity outputs 
are either exported or sold domestically, while commodities comprise of domestic supply and imports. 
This separation of activities from commodities is preferred because it permits activities to produce 
multiple commodities (for example, a dairy activity may produce cheese and milk that are delivered into 
different commodity markets) while any commodity may be produced by multiple activities (for example, 
different activities for small scale and large-scale maize production may both produce the same maize 
commodity).  
Second, the matrix explicitly associates trade flows with transactions (trade and transportation) 
costs, also referred to as marketing margins. For each commodity, the SAM accounts for the transaction 
costs associated with domestic, import, and export marketing. For domestic marketing of domestic output, 
the marketing margin represents the cost of moving the commodity from the producer to the domestic 
market. For imports, it represents the cost of moving the commodity from the border (adding to the c.i.f. 
price) to the domestic market, while for exports; it shows the cost of moving the commodity from the 
producer to the border (reducing the price received by producers relative to the f.o.b. price).  
Third, the government is disaggregated into a core government account and different tax 
collection accounts, one for each tax type. This disaggregation is often necessary because the economic 
interpretation of some payments may otherwise be ambiguous. In any given application, the SAM may 
exclude any (or all) of these specific tax collection accounts. In the SAM, payments between the 
government and the other domestic institutions represent government transfers. 
Fourth, the domestic non-government institutions in the SAM consist of households and 
enterprises. The enterprises earn factor incomes (reflecting their ownership of capital and/or land) and 
may also receive transfers from other institutions. Enterprises pay corporate (direct) taxes, save, and 
transfer profits to other institutions. Assuming that the relevant data are available, it is preferable to have 
one or more accounts for enterprises when these have tax obligations and savings behavior that are 
                                                      
14 This section was taken from Acevedo (2005).  46
independent of and different from the household sector. Enterprises should be disaggregated in a manner 
that captures differences across various enterprise types in terms of tax rates, savings rates, and the shares 
of retained earnings that are received by different household types. 
Finally, the SAM distinguishes between own home consumption, which is activity-based, and 
marketed consumption, which is commodity-based. Home consumption, which in the SAM appears as 
household payments to activities, is valued at producer prices. Household consumption of marketed 
commodities appears as payments from household accounts to commodity accounts, the values of which 
include marketing margins and commodity taxes. 
The main sources of information were the Input-Output Matrix (IOM) estimated by the Central 
Bank of Reserve of El Salvador for 2000 and the Multiple Purposes Household Survey (MPHS) 
elaborated by the National Office of Statistics (Dirección General de Estadística y Censos, DIGESTYC) 
for the same year. Data from these two sources were complemented by information coming from the 
national accounts and balance of payments statistics compiled by the Central Bank, tax collection data 
from the Ministry of Finance, and data on production costs for the agriculture and livestock sectors 
estimated by the General Office of Agricultural Economy (Dirección General de Economía Agropecuaria, 
DGEA) at the Agriculture and Livestock Ministry (Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería, MAG).  
As it is standard in assembling SAMs, production is split into two types of categories: “activities” 
and “commodities”. The activity account may be thought of as the domestic producers account. On the 
column, it consists of intermediate inputs, value added and value added taxes. This data come from the 
IOM for year 2000. Along the row, it accounts for domestic production and home consumption. Because 
there is no own consumption in the Salvadoran macro accounts, this is calculated from microdata on 
subsistence farming provided by the DGEA and then subtracted from the purchased private consumption 
entry in the macro SAM. The sum of the activity purchases or income is production at factor costs, or 
gross domestic output, which in El Salvador SAM equals US$19,960 million. 
The factors´ entry in the macro SAM has three columns and respective rows, for aggregated 
labor, capital, and aggregated land. The factors are divided in eighteen groups: capital, land, and sixteen 
categories of labor. In turn, the labor force is divided into skilled and unskilled labor, both disaggregated 
by whether a person works in the tradable or nontradable sector, whether he/she works in an urban or 
rural area, and by gender. Unskilled labor is defined as those workers who completed at most ninth grade. 
Skilled workers are those with more than nine years of schooling.  
In the case of El Salvador, there is no aggregate data for returns to land, but rather returns to land 
are included in the returns to capital. This is amended by using estimates from the production costs for 
agricultural activities estimated by the DGEA.   47
The outcome is a 123 by 123 matrix which includes 45 activities, 45 commodities, 3 marketing 
margin accounts, 18 factors of production (16 labor categories plus value added capital and value added 
land), 1 enterprise account, 4 households groups, a government account, 3 accounts for taxes (taxes are 
collected and transferred to the government through these accounts), an investment/savings account, a 
stock change account, and the rest of the world (RoW) account.  
The disaggregation of activities and commodities in the micro SAM follows the structure of the 
2000 IOM. Therefore, it has 45 production sectors in the economy, meaning that there are 45 activities 
and 45 commodities.  
Table B.1. SAM Production sectors 
1.  Coffee 
2.  Cotton 
3.  Grains 
4.  Sugar cane 
5.  Other agricultural activities 
6.  Livestock 
7.  Poultry 
8.  Forestry 
9.  Fisheries 
10. Mining 
11. Meat products 
12. Dairy products 
13. Processed products from fishing 
14. Wheat manufacturing 
15. Sugar 
16. Other processed foods 
17. Beverages 
18. Tobacco products 
19. Textiles 
20. Wearing apparel 
21. Leather products 
22. Wood products 
23. Paper products 
24. Printing and publishing 
25. Chemicals 
26. Petroleum products 
27. Rubber and plastic products 
28. Mineral products 
29. Metal products 
30. Machinery and equipment 





36. Hotels and restaurants 
37. Transportation 
38. Communication 
39. Financial services 
40. Real estate 
41. Housing 
42. Personal services 
43. Domestic services 
44. Public administration 
45. Maquila 
After the commodities and activities transactions are quantified, the other actors from the macro 
SAM can be broken down. In particular, aggregate labor is divided by skill level (skilled or unskilled), 
region (urban-rural) and gender, and households are divided by region (urban or rural) and schooling of 
the household head.  
The micro SAM is used to map the income that the labor categories receive from the production 
sectors and then direct it to the different households. The mapping is determined using data on household  48
income from the MPHS. The distribution of the activities payments to labor categories is based on the 
household survey, too. The information provided by the MPHS is crucial to build the micro SAM.
15  
The households are distinguished by location (urban and rural) and the educational level of the 
household head (whether he/she has completed at least ninth grade), for a total of four household types. 
The relevant information to classify them according to these categories comes from the MPHS. Labor 
payments by category get distributed to the different households (known as the “allocation matrix”) 
according to the household survey data (MPHS). The distribution of land payments among households is 
also based on the MPHS. On the other hand, households receive capital payments via the enterprise 
account. This is distributed on the assumption that the share of households in total capital payments is 
determined by their shares in total income. 




        Skill                                       Gender   
 
TUWM   Unskilled  Rural  Male 
 TUNM  Unskilled  Urban  Male 
TSWM Skilled  Rural Male 
TSNM Skilled  Urban  Male 
TUWF Unskilled  Rural Female 
TUNF Unskilled  Urban  Female 
TSWF Skilled  Rural  Female 
TSNF Skilled  Urban  Female 
The share of a household-type consumption in the total consumption of a commodity is based on 
the assumption that this share is the same as its share in total income, given by the MPHS. Then, the 
consumption share is applied to the total consumption of the commodity, as given from the IOM data. 
This is a bold assumption but it seems reasonable in the absence of data based on a consumption survey.  
Data on the rest of the world purchases of exports from the commodity accounts are taken from 
the 2000 IOM. Rest of the world transfer payments to households are derived from the Central Bank 
national accounts data on (aggregated) transfer payments, distributed among households according to the 
shares given by the MPHS. Foreign savings is the same as in the macro SAM. Imports from the rest of the 
world come from the IOM database, while the other rest of the world receipts (from the capital factor and 
the government) equal the macro SAM totals. The savings-investment account shows investment in each 
commodity down the column, as given by the 2000 IOM. Information on the stock change comes from 
the IOM, too. Receipts from government and the rest of the world are from the macro SAM totals.  
 
                                                      
15 The MPHS sample for year 2000 included around 15,000 households.  49
The SAM was balanced using consistency equations programmed in GAMS (Generic Algebraic 
Modeling System; See Brooke, A et al, 1988). The entropy approach used to obtain a balanced SAM can 
be seen in S. Robinson et al (2002).  
Before the SAM was balanced some inconsistencies in the data were seen. We corrected for these 
using national data and leave the economic identities to be solved in the code programmed in GAMS.  
It was necessary to aggregate real state services, housing, personal services and domestic 
services. The data represented in those activities was not very clear and not relevant for our analysis. As 
well as consolidate the beverages and tobacco activities. 
The major problems were seen in the data for coffee and transaction costs. Also, it was necessary 
to divide the maquila sector in two; one that exports and the other one that imports.   50
Table B.3. National social accounting matrix used in the CGE model 
Receipts  Activities Commodities  Factors  Households Enterprises Government Savings – 
investment 
Rest of the 















Investment Exports  Demand 
Factors  Value-added         Factor  income 
Households 
 















  Factor  income 
to enterprises 
  Transfers  to 
enterprises 












Factor taxes  Transfers, 
direct taxes 















Rest of the 
World 
(RoW) 
 Imports  Factor  income 
to RoW 

























Source: Adapted from Lofgren, Harris, and Robinson; 2001.  51
A Formal Statement of the Dynamic CGE Model 
Table B.4. The dynamic CGE model 
Symbol Explanation  Symbol  Explanation 
aA ∈   activities  () cC M N C ∈ ⊂   commodities not in CM 
() aA C E S A ∈⊂   activities with a CES function at 
the top of the technology nest  () cC T C ∈ ⊂   transaction service 
commodities 
() aA L E O A ∈⊂  
activities with a Leontief 
function at the top of the 
technology nest 
() cC X C ∈ ⊂   commodities with domestic 
production  
cC ∈   commodities  f F ∈   factors 
() cC D C ∈⊂   commodities with domestic sales 
of domestic output  iI N S ∈  
institutions (domestic and 
rest of world) 
() cC D N C ∈⊂   commodities not in CD  () i INSD INS ∈ ⊂   domestic institutions 
() cC E C ∈⊂   exported commodities   () i INSDNG INSD ∈ ⊂   domestic non-government 
institutions 
() cC E N C ∈⊂   commodities not in CE  () hH I N S D N G ∈ ⊂   households 
() cC M C ∈⊂  
 
imported commodities  fls F ∈   factors with supply curve 
PARAMETERS 
c cwts   weight of commodity c in the 
CPI  c qg  
base-year quantity of 
government demand 
c dwts   weight of commodity c in the 
producer price index  c qinv  
base-year quantity of private 
investment demand 
ca ica   quantity of c as intermediate 
input per unit of activity a  if shif  
share for domestic 
institution I in income of 
factor f 
' cc icd  
quantity of commodity c as trade 
input per unit of c’ produced and 
sold domestically 
' ii shii  
share of net income of i’ to I 
(i’ ∈ INSDNG’; I ∈ 
INSDNG) 
' cc ice   quantity of commodity c as trade 
input per exported unit of c’  a ta   Tax rate for activity a 
' cc icm   quantity of commodity c as trade 
input per imported unit of c’   c te   export tax rate 
a inta  
quantity of aggregate 
intermediate input per activity 
unit 
f tf   direct tax rate for factor f 
a iva  
quantity of aggregate 
intermediate input per activity 
unit 
i tins  
exogenous direct tax rate for 
domestic institution i 
i mps  
base savings rate for domestic 
institution i  i tins01  
0-1 parameter with 1 for 
institutions with potentially 
flexed direct tax rates 
i mps01  
0-1 parameter with 1 for 
institutions with potentially 
flexed direct tax rates 
c tm   import tariff rate 
c pwe   export price (foreign currency)  c tq    rate of sales tax 
c pwm   import price (foreign currency)    if trnsfr   transfer from factor f to 
institution i  52
Table B.4. Continued 
Symbol Explanation  Symbol  Explanation 
c qdst   quantity of stock change  a tva  
rate of value-added tax for 
activity a 
 
f etals  
parameter in labor supply 
equation 
 
   
1a INVSHR   capital shares  r PK   price of capital 
fa DKAPS   gross fixed capital formation  fa QF   next period sectoral capital 
stock 
WFXAV   average capital rental rate 
k deprate  





a α   efficiency parameter in the CES 
activity function 
t
c δ   CET function share 
parameter 
va
a α   efficiency parameter in the CES 
value-added function 
va
fa δ  
CES value-added function 
share parameter for factor f 
in activity a 
ac
c α   shift parameter for domestic 
commodity aggregation function 
m
ch γ  
subsistence consumption of 
marketed commodity c for 
household h 
q
c α   Armington function shift 
parameter 
h
ach γ  
subsistence consumption of 
home commodity c from 
activity a for household h 
t
c α   CET function shift parameter  ac θ   yield of output c per unit of 
activity a 
h
ach β  
marginal share of consumption 
spending on home commodity c 
from activity a for household h 
a
a ρ        CES production function 
exponent 
m
ch β  
marginal share of consumption 
spending on marketed 
commodity c for household h 
va
a ρ   CES value-added function 
exponent 
a
a δ   CES activity function share 
parameter 
ac





ac δ   share parameter for domestic 
commodity aggregation function 
q
c ρ   Armington function 
exponent 
q
c δ   Armington function share 
parameter 
t
c ρ   CET function exponent 
 VARIABLES 
CPI   consumer price index   MPSADJ  
savings rate scaling factor (= 0 
for base) 
DTINS  
change in domestic institution 
tax share  (= 0 for base; 
exogenous variable) 
f QFS   quantity supplied of factor 
FSAV    foreign savings (FCU)  TINSADJ  
direct tax scaling factor (= 0 
for base; exogenous variable) 
GADJ  
government consumption 
adjustment factor  fa WFDIST  
wage distortion factor for 
factor f in activity a  53
Table B.4. Continued 
Symbol Explanation  Symbol  Explanation 
IADJ   investment adjustment factor     
DMPS  
change in domestic institution 
savings rates (= 0 for base; 
exogenous variable) 
fa QF   quantity demanded of factor f 
from activity a 
DPI  
producer price index for 
domestically marketed output  c QG   government consumption 
demand for commodity 
EG   government expenditures  ch QH   quantity consumed of 
commodity c by household h 
h EH   consumption spending for 
household  ach QHA  
quantity of household home 
consumption of commodity c 
from activity a for household h 
EXR 
exchange rate (LCU  per unit of 
FCU)  a QINTA   quantity of aggregate 
intermediate input 
GOVSHR  
government consumption share 
in nominal absorption  ca QINT   quantity of commodity c as 
intermediate input to activity a 
GSAV   government savings  c QINV   quantity of investment demand 
for commodity 
INVSHR  
investment share in nominal 
absorption  c QM   quantity of imports of 
commodity 
i MPS  
marginal propensity to save for 
domestic non-government 
institution (exogenous variable) 
c QQ  
quantity of goods supplied to 
domestic market (composite 
supply) 
a PA   activity price (unit gross 
revenue)  c QT    quantity of commodity 
demanded as trade input 
c PDD   demand price for commodity 
produced and sold domestically  a QVA   quantity of (aggregate) 
value-added 
c PDS   supply price for commodity 
produced and sold domestically  c QX  
aggregated quantity of 
domestic output of 
commodity 
c PE   export price (domestic currency)  ac QXAC    quantity of output of 
commodity c from activity a 
a PINTA   aggregate intermediate input 
price for activity a  TABS   total nominal absorption 
c PM   import price (domestic currency)  i TINS   direct tax rate for institution 
i (i ∈ INSDNG) 
c PQ   composite commodity price  ' ii TRII  
transfers from institution i’ 
to i (both in the set 
INSDNG) 
a PVA   value-added price (factor income 
per unit of activity)  f WFREAL   average real price of factor 
c PX   aggregate producer price for 
commodity  f WF   average price of factor 
ac PXAC   producer price of commodity c 
for activity a  f YF   income of factor f 
a QA   quantity (level) of activity  YG   government revenue 
c QD   quantity sold domestically of 
domestic output  i YI   income of domestic non-
government institution 
c QE   quantity of exports  if YIF   income to domestic 
institution i from factor f 
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Table B.4. Continued 
EQUATIONS 







1 cc c c c c
cC T
import import tariff exchange rate cost of trade
price price adjust LCUper inputs per
LCU FCU ment FCU import unit
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1 cc c c c c c
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domestic sales quantity import quantity
sales tax
PQ tq QQ PDD QD PM QM ⋅− ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅
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5 
cc cc cc
producer price domestic supply price export price
times marketed times times
output quantity domestic sales quantity export quantity
PX QX PDS QD PE QE ⋅= ⋅ + ⋅
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤
=+ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥
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Table B.4. Continued 
# Equation Domain Description 
8 
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net of taxes pricetimes
input pricetimes
times activity level quantity
quantity
PA ta QA PVA QVA PINTA QINTA ⋅− ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅
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f F ∈   Labor supply  
19 
ca ca a
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for commodity c  input quantity 
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Institution Block 
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fa f ff a
aA
sum of activity payments
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  f F ∈   Factor income 
31 
() 1 if if f f r o w  f
income of  share of income income of  factor f
institution i  of factor f to (net of tax and 
from factor f institution i transfer to RoW)
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